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ABSTRACT
Previous research has shown that anxiety-disordered
subjects attend to information directly relevant to their
area of concern.

In this study, it was postulated that

cardiac-related stimuli would have attention capturing
characteristics for individuals with no psychiatric history
but who had recently experienced a myocardial infarction
(MI).

To study this hypothesis, MI subjects (n=34) and

matched controls (n=31) participated in an attentional
search task.

MI subjects showed slower reaction times (R T )

for both cardiac and socially threatening distractors
compared to RT when neutral distractors were present.

For

both MI and control subjects distress level was associated
with increased interference from socially threatening
distractors.

For control subjects only, reported level of

cardiac concern was associated with RT speeding when
cardiac distractors were present.

In a second stage of

this experiment, half of the subjects were instructed to
suppress thoughts of an MI while the remaining subjects
were instructed to think of anything.
prediction,

Contrary to

subjects who suppressed thoughts of an MI did

not show increased interference from cardiac distractors in
a subsequent attentional search task.

INTRODUCTION
Myocardial infarction (MI) is defined as the death of
heart tissue resultant from oxygen deprivation.

The

American Heart Association (1987) estimates that each year
approximately 1,500,000 individuals experience an MI and,
one quarter of all U.S. deaths are due to MI.

The current

death rate, however, is declining because improved medical
technology has led to increased survival rates (Pasternak,
Braunwald, & Sobel,

1988).

For those who survive, the MI experience presents
psychological as well as physical consequences.

Adverse

emotional reactions to MI are associated with poorer
recovery as shown by decreased levels of return to work,
poorer sexual functioning, and diminished ability to enjoy
life (Maeland & Havik,

1987).

However, much variability

exists in the types of psychological reactions that post-MI
patients evince, and these reactions seem only weakly
related to actual infarction severity (Mayou,
Trelawny-Ross & Russell,

1987).

1984;

Therefore, understanding

differential psychological responses to such a major
stressor is of both practical significance and theoretical
interest.

Possible explanations for differential MI

responses include pre-existing individual differences,
different coping responses, or some interaction between
personality and coping.

The aim of this study is to

investigate how an MI impacts the processing of threatening

1
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information, and how specific coping strategies maymoderate stressor influence.
Coping responses to a stressor frequently have been
discussed in terms of either attending to or avoiding
information relevant to the stressor (Roth & Cohen,
Suls & Fletcher,

1985).

1986;

However, researchers typically

have measured attention/avoidance with self-report measures
of coping style.

In this study non-self report measures of

attentional or avoidant strategies were assessed by using
information processing paradigms.
The intent of this study was twofold: to investigate
attentional reactions of individuals who experienced an MI
and to investigate the effect strategic avoidance of
cardiac-related stimuli had on attentional deployment.

To

address the first research question, patients who
experienced an MI were asked to participate in a
computerized attentional search task modeled after
paradigms employed by Broadbent, Broadbent, and Jones
(1986) and Mathews, May, Mogg, and Eysenck (1990).
Subjects were asked to respond to a target word accompanied
by other distracting words.

The main prediction of this

study was that reaction times for post-MI subjects, as
compared with responses of age-matched controls, would be
longer when cardiac-related distractors were present.
Longer response latencies were assumed to be a function of

3

the attention-capturing properties of the distracting
stimuli.
The second question addressed by this study was the
potential attentional consequences of intentionally
suppressing stress-related thoughts.

To address this

issue, it was necessary to create a situation where the
subject would suppress certain thoughts.

Specifically,

some subjects were asked to not think about anything
related to heart disease.

Other subjects were instructed

to think of anything at all.

After this manipulation,

subjects repeated the attentional deployment task
previously described.

It was predicted that response

latencies when cardiac-related distractors were present
would be longer for subjects required to suppress heartrelated thoughts.

This prediction was based on the

hypothesis that actively avoiding heart-related information
would paradoxically increase attention directed to cardiac
stimuli.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Psychological Reactions to an MI
Emotional responses to an M I .

It is generally

believed that following an MI, patients frequently
experience some degree of psychological distress (Sykes,
Evans, Boyle, Mcllmoyle, & Salathia, 1989).

Given the

presumed stressful nature of experiencing an MI and its
potential disorganizing effect on behavior, a number of
studies have investigated both short- and long-term anxiety
responses in post-MI patients.

However, research in this

area has not been able to consistently identify a universal
stress reaction in individuals who have experienced a heart
attack.
An early study by Hackett and Cassem (1976) found when
psychiatric rating scales were used to assess anxiety
approximately 50% of post MI subjects experienced at least
moderate levels of anxiety.

The results of other research

using clinical ratings of anxiety have shown varied
outcomes.

The number of patients judged to be exhibiting

an anxious response have ranged from 19% to 85% (Cay,
Vetter, Philip & Dugard, 1972; Havik & Maeland, 1990;
Mayou, Williamson, & Foster, 1978; Stern, Caplan, & Cassem,
1987).
The techniques used in these studies share the same
methodological flaws.

First of all, using clinician rating

scales results in subjective judgments about what
4
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constitutes an anxiety reaction, and standardization
procedures were not conducted on clinical rating scales.
Additional problems included lack of data on the types of
reactions experienced by relevant control groups such as
other hospitalized patient groups.

This latter problem

resulted in the inability to distinguish between an anxiety
reaction based on the MI as a stressor versus
hospitalization as the sole stressor.
Some studies have attempted to address these problems
by using standardized measures of anxiety such as the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch,
& Luchene,

1970) and comparing the responses of MI patients

to those of other illness populations.

The findings from

the majority of these studies suggest that immediately
following an MI, anxiety scores are elevated significantly
when compared with a normative sample (Pancheri,
Bellaterra, Matteoli, Cristofari, Polizze, & Puletti,
Sykes, et al.,
1987).

1978;

1989; Thompson, Webster, Cordle, & Sutton,

However, in absolute terms the anxiety scores of

the cardiac group were not much higher than those of the
normative control group.

In addition, when scores of

cardiac patients were compared with a control group of
other medical patients, no anxiety score differences were
found (Sykes, et al.,
1977 ).

1989; Vetter, Cay, Philip, & Strange,

6

Results from studies using standardized instruments
suggest that, as a group, MI patients experience a small
but significant increase in anxiety.

This increase,

however, is no greater than the increase in anxiety scores
found in individuals hospitalized with other medical
illnesses.

One problem with drawing any definitive

conclusions from this body of research is that all of these
studies used between-subject designs.

Since it would be

very difficult to measure psychological state both before
and after an MI, no pre-post studies have been reported.
The implication of this methodological problem is that the
types of post-MI emotional changes can only be inferred.
One type of study using within-subject procedures
measures a patient's emotional state for a period of time
following MI.

These studies suggest MI patients do

experience psychological distress immediately following a
heart attack, and the distress lasts at least six months.
During hospitalization, anxiety levels seem highest
immediately after a heart attack and diminish somewhat with
admission to a coronary care unit (Vetter, et al.,

1977).

However, when the individual is transferred to a general
medical ward, anxiety increases significantly.

A steady

decrease in anxiety level occurs throughout the
individual's stay in the general medical ward, but a slight
elevation occurs immediately before discharge (Philip, Cay,
Vetter, & Stuckey,

1979; Thompson et al.,

1987).

Investigators postulated that increases in anxiety are due
to concerns that future cardiac complications may occur
when medical services are not at hand.
Investigations of long-term emotional reactions
indicate that elevated anxiety levels exist for at least
six months.
(1987)

In one study using the STAI, Thompson et al.

found equally high state anxiety scores on day one

and at six weeks after the MI.

At one year, however, state

anxiety scores decreased, suggesting that patients no
longer experienced significant emotional distress.

Havik

and Maeland (1990) reported similar findings using a
semantic differential type rating scale to assess anxiety
levels.

These researchers found that after six weeks,

ratings for depression decreased, but anxiety levels had
not changed at a six-month follow-up.

In sum, data from

longitudinal studies suggest that most individuals
experience increased anxiety following an MI, and this
emotional distress may last for at least six months.
Content of post-MI worry.

Although a number of

studies have attempted to measure the degree of emotional
distress cardiac patients experience, only a few studies
have attempted to identify specific cognitions co-occurring
with the emotional distress.

In a longitudinal study,

Thompson et al. (1987) required subjects to rate the amount
of concern the MI produced.

In this study, subjects rated

thoughts associated with the cardiac event itself as the

8

most anxiety producing cognition, followed by concerns of
future cardiac functioning.

When measured across time,

fluctuations of reported frequency of these concerns were
congruent with STAI measures of state anxiety.
In another study, Wiklund, Sanne, Vedin, and
Wilhelmsson (1984) measured specific sources of worry in
post Ml-patients.

Measures in this study were taken two

months and one year after the MI.

Two months after the

cardiac event, 81% of 131 post-MI respondents reported
frequent worry about heart disease, 82% stated that
thoughts of their cardiac state produced worry and anxiety,
and 74% stated that they worried about future cardiac
functioning.

When re-assessed ten months later,

respondents reported significant decreases in time spent
thinking and worrying about the MI.
One possible reason for the limited data on sources of
post-MI worry is that researchers may assume concern
regarding future functioning will almost universally create
emotional distress.

A review of the available studies

suggests this is indeed the case, with the vast majority of
MI patients reporting at least some disturbing thoughts
regarding the cardiac experience.

In addition, these

thoughts appear to co-occur with feelings of anxiety and
may in fact be the individual's source of apprehension.
Individual differences in emotional reactions.
Although most individuals experience at least some

emotional distress following an MI, psychological responses
vary greatly and appear only marginally related to MI
severity (Mayou,

1984).

Research into individual

differences has focused primarily on coping styles to
explain variance in emotional reactions.

Although much has

been written concerning ways patients cope with illness,
studies investigating coping styles of MI patients have
centered almost exclusively on denial in these patients
(Havik & Maeland,

1988).

Early studies of denial in MI patients indicate that
deniers either show lower levels of anxiety and depression
when compared to non-deniers or show a more rapid decrease
in anxiety (Billing Lindell, Sederholm, & Theorell,
Froese, Hackett, Cassem, & Silverberg,
Cassem,

1974).

1980;

1974; Hackett &

In these studies investigators defined

denial as the conscious or unconscious denial of all or
part of meaning associated with illness and measured this
construct with a self-report denial scale.

Subjects were

divided into either deniers or non-deniers based on their
responses.

More recent investigations treat denial as a

multi-dimensional construct.

Questionnaires measuring

denial were broken down via principal components analysis
into three factors:
and suppression.

denial of illness, denial of impact,

Results from later studies indicate that

denial of impact, as opposed to denial of illness, is

10

associated with better psychological functioning following
an MI (Havik & Maelands,

1988).

Currently, a scarcity of literature exists concerning
MI coping reactions.

Current data suggest that denying the

impact an MI will have on future functioning may result in
better short-term psychological adjustment.

Although the

literature alluded to potential long-term problems
associated with denial, no empirical investigations have
taken place.
Coping Reactions
Although little research has been conducted on cardiac
patients' coping styles, a relatively large body of
literature is available for a general discussion of coping
styles.

As previously mentioned, the various discussions

of coping have categorized coping strategies either as an
avoidant process or as a strategy where individuals focus
on the stressor.

A variety of terms describe an avoidant

strategy for dealing with stressful information.

These

terms include "blunting, attenuation, denial, distraction,
repression, and suppression".

Although these terms refer

to different behaviors, they all emphasize focusing
attention away from a stressor.

The antithesis to avoidant

strategies involve focusing attention toward the stressor.
Likewise, there are a number of terms (eg.,
augmentation,

"monitoring,

sensitization, and vigilance") that reflect

an attentive coping style (Suls & Fletcher,

1984).

Investigators for this study are interested in the
coping style literature because it has emphasized the role
of attention in responding to threat-

It is interesting to

note that although attentional deployment remains central
to discussions of coping, attention, per se, is not
measured.

Instead, researchers have relied on self-report

measures designed to assess vigilance.

For example, two

conceptualizations of coping strategies are repression sensitization (Bell & Byrne,
blunting (Miller,

1980).

1978) and monitoring -

In the case of repression -

sensitization, coping style is measured with a MMPI
subscale, and for monitoring - blunting, coping style is
assessed using a hypothetical behavioral preference test.
Although each of these coping styles focus on the concept
of attention/avoidance, measures of attention to a
threatening cue are not taken.
Another important question addressed in the coping
style literature is whether individuals react differently
to stress (eg., some individuals attend to stressor and
others avoid it), or if all individuals show similar
response patterns.

In other words, are there individual

differences in coping reactions, or is coping better
described as a universal process allowing for individual
variation in intensity and duration?

Their is some

empirical support for the individual difference hypothesis
(ie.,

some individuals attend to stress-related

information, and others avoid it) (Bell & Byrne,
Miller,

1980; 1987).

1978;

However, it is possible these

individual differences are a function of the methods used
to measure attention and avoidance and may not reflect how
people respond to stress.

For example, the Miller

Behavioral Style Scale (MBSS) requires subjects to choose a
behavioral style they would adopt in a series of stressful
situations.

Although the data suggests this scale has

adequate reliability and discriminant validity (Miller,
1987; Miller & Managan,

1983), this measure may simply

assess preferred behavioral style rather than actual coping
style.

Therefore, it is possible that all individuals

would show the same attentional bias toward a stressor
although some individuals prefer to avoid it.

If this

scenario is correct, the measure of coping style would
merely measure behavioral preference.

Individual

differences in actual attentional processes may or may not
be present when the individual is exposed to stressful
stimuli.
A related but slightly different unaddressed question
is whether coping style is an automatic or strategic
process.

Since coping style has been frequently presented

as a personality variable, there may be an implicit
assumption that attention/avoidance to a stressor is
somewhat automatized.

However, methods used to measure

coping (eg., preferred behavioral style) also suggest

13

researchers believe some volitional control is involved.
When considered from an information processing perspective,
coping style may be both an automatic and a strategic
process.

More automatic processes associated with initial

attention may occur at an early stage of processing, while
during later stages the individual may choose to continue
attending to the stimuli or may take behavioral or
cognitive actions to avoid it.

In other words, although

initial attentional reactions may be automatic, volitional
strategies may override these initial reactions once
controlled processes are activated.
The relationship between actual attentional strategies
and coping style as measured with self-report measures is
unknown.

Miller (1980;

1987) argues that some individuals

(monitors) will attend to threatening information, while
others (blunters) will avoid these cues.

However, these

discussions of coping style do not identify the
hypothesized processing stage that attention/avoidance
occurs.

Since scales such as the MBSS seem to measure

volitional strategies, it is likely that monitoring/
blunting takes place during later processing stages.
Consequently, the relationship between vigilance as
measured by self-report methods and selective attention as
defined from an information processing perspective is
unknown.

For example, blunters may show a greater

attentional bias to stressor-related stimuli.

This

14

seemingly paradoxical effect could occur if the process of
actively trying to avoid certain information makes that
information more emotional and thus attracts more attention
in the future.

A more complete discussion of the

relationship between strategic avoidance and attention will
be presented in later sections.
A final question of practical and theoretical
importance is determining which coping strategy is best.
The current data suggest the answer depends on the type of
stressor and the amount of time the stressor will be
present.

In a meta-analysis of the relative efficacy of

coping styles, Suls and Fletcher (1985) conclude that for
short-term adaption, instructions to either attend to or
avoid a stressful stimuli produce better coping responses
than no instructions at all.

However, attention to

stressful stimuli is effective only if attention is
directed toward sensory (as opposed to emotional) aspects
of the stressor.

If subjects instructed to attend were not

provided with a non-emotional attentional strategy or were
told to attend to the emotional aspects of the stressor,
short-term adaptation was significantly poorer than for
subjects who avoided.

For example, Leventhal, Brown,

Shacham, and Enquist (1979) found when subjects who placed
their hand in ice cold water were instructed to attend to
objective aspects of the discomfort (ie., the temperature
of the water), they reported less distress than subjects

15

who were distracted from the stressor.

However, if the

subjects were told to attend to the emotional consequences
of the stressor, they reported more distress than the
distractors.

In contrast to the results of short-term

studies, there was modest support for the hypothesis that
attentional strategies are more efficacious than avoidance
in long-term adaptation (Suls & Fletcher,

1985).

A problem plaguing the conclusions of this research is
its ambiguity as to how subjects actually responded to the
stressor.

Possibly,

subjects attended to some features of

the stressor and avoided other aspects regardless of
instruction.

An alternative to the self-report approach is

to use information-processing paradigms to study reactions
to stress.

These techniques provide a more direct, less

subjective assessment of attentional style.
Information Processing Approach to Attention
Researchers in the area of emotional disorders,
particularly anxiety, have also studied issues associated
with attentional styles.

The basic hypothesis underlying

experimentation in this area purports anxious individuals
show an attentional bias toward threat-related material
(MacLeod, Mathews,

& Tata,

1986).

A large body of research

currently exists showing individuals diagnosed with an
anxiety disorder attend to threatening material to a
greater degree than normal controls.

Experimental methods.

Of interest to this study are

not only the research findings but also the experimental
procedures used to test the attentional bias hypothesis.
Specifically, the conclusions of this research have been
based mainly on studies using information-processing
methodology borrowed from basic cognitive science.
measures used fall into two basic categories:

The

those

measuring attentional capture characteristics of the
stimuli and those in which attentional bias is inferred
from interference of performance.

Using the former method,

attention has been measured by presenting subjects with two
words in different areas of a Video Display Unit (V D U ).
Immediately following presentation of the two words, a
probe (usually a dot) appears behind one of the words and
subjects must respond to the location of the probe (this
technique is known as the attention probe method).

If

response time latencies are faster for one particular type
of word, it is believed that this enhancement in
performance is due to attention capturing properties of
that word type (MacLeod et al.,

1986).

Examples of tasks

in which attentional bias is inferred from slower reaction
times include versions of the Stroop interference paradigm
and attentional search measures (Mathews & MacLeod,
Mathews, et al.,
paradigms,

1990).

1985;

In the attentional search

subjects are presented with three words: one

target word and two distracting words.

Subjects are

17

instructed to ignore the distracting words and respond to
the target word by pressing the appropriate key.

If

reaction times are slower when threatening words are
present, it is inferred the delay is due to attentional
capture by the threatening stimuli.
Explanations other than attentional bias can explain
performance interference in the Stroop and attentional
search paradigms.

For example, the decrement in reaction

time could be due to heightened negative affect resulting
from exposure to threatening words.

While alternative

explanations cannot be ruled out, similarities between the
results of interference paradigms and the attention probe
paradigms argue the most parsimonious conclusion is that
interference effects are a function of attentional bias
(Mathews, 1993).
Specificity of threat.

The basic finding that anxious

individuals attend to threatening information has been
replicated in a number of studies (see Mathews,
review).

1990 for a

Although initial investigations showed a general

attentional bias to all threatening information (MacLeod et
al.,

1986), the results of later studies suggest

attentional biases occur in response to specific areas of
concern.

Using the Stroop paradigm,

interference effects

specific to an individual's area of concern are found for
PTSD subjects (McNally, Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin,
panic patients (Ehlers, Margraf, Davies, & Roth,

1990),

1988;

18

McNally, Riemann, & Kim,

1990) and spider phobics (Watts,

McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise,

1986).

In addition, Mogg,

Mathews, and Weinman (1989) found that anxious patients who
reported worrying about illness showed greater interference
to physically threatening words than subjects who reported
more social concerns.

Therefore, evidence from a number of

studies suggests attention is captured by threat
information directly relevant to the individual's area of
concern.
With respect to this current study, whether or not
post-MI patients show an attentional bias toward threatrelated material is currently unknown.

Also unknown is

whether or not an individual will attend to all threatening
stimuli or solely information related to the trauma, if an
attentional bias is found.

It is plausible the emotional

distress caused by a life threatening experience could
result in a generalized bias to all threatening
information.

However, current research suggests the

putative bias will be directed toward information closely
related to the stressor.
State vs. trait effects.

Although anxious individuals

do show attentional biases, it remains unclear whether this
bias is a function of the individual's mood state,
particular characteristics associated with people who
develop anxiety disorders, or a combination of state and
trait effects.

Research comparing currently anxious and

19

recovered patients has generally found that attentional
biases tend to dissipate upon successful treatment (Foa &
McNally,

1986; Watts, et al.,

1986).

This finding

emphasizes the role of negative mood state and worry in
attentional bias, and de-emphasizes the importance of trait
characteristics.

However, in one longitudinal study

investigating high- and low-trait anxious student's
responses to stress, only high-trait subjects showed
attentional bias during the stress.

Specifically, MacLeod

and Mathews (1988) found no differences between high- and
low-trait students using a measure of attentional bias at
the beginning of a semester.

When these same students were

tested during an examination period, high-trait but not
low-trait students showed an attentional bias to examrelated stimuli.

This difference occurred although both

groups reported increases in anxiety during the examination
period.

MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) also found that

high-trait anxious subjects attended to exam-related
stimuli, but only when cues were presented at a subliminal
level.
Presently, no definitive conclusions can be drawn
regarding the importance of trait anxiety characteristics
in the development of attentional biases to threatening
information.

One possible conclusion is that high-trait

anxious individuals have cognitive characteristics such
that the experience of a stressful event results in these

20

individuals attending to information relevant to the
stressor.

Conversely,

low-trait individuals may actually

show an avoidance of threatening stimuli.

However, because

no study has varied severity of the stressor, the way that
high- and low-trait subjects respond to various degrees of
stress is unknown.

For example, low-level chronic stress

(such as taking an exam) may only result in cognitive
biases for individuals predisposed to behave anxiously.
The attentional response to a major stressor (such as an
MI), however, may prove similar for both high- and lowtrait subjects.
Automatic vs controlled processes.

Issues of

automaticity in cognitive biases have been investigated
with paradigms using dichotic listening tasks and
subliminal presentation of visual stimuli on interference
tasks.

In both types of studies, anxious subjects

exhibited greater performance interference when threatening
or personally relevant information was presented as a
distractor (Bargh,
1993).

1982; Mathews & MacLeod,

1986; Mathews,

This interference occurred in spite of subjects'

inability to identify the threatening stimuli.

Because

interference seems to have occurred without complete
awareness of threatening information, these findings are
used as evidence that attentional capture occurs in an
automatic rather than a controlled fashion.
finding that threatening information can result in

The

attentional bias even without awareness of that information
seems somewhat illogical.

Imagining how threatening words

can cause interference before the subject is aware of the
word is difficult.

Attempts to explain this problem

suggest awareness is not a dichotic phenomenon (aware vs.
unaware), but rather a continuous one.

On one end of the

continuum a stimuli may be objectively presented, but the
subject is unable to report the content of the stimuli.
The subject, however,

is able to correctly identify that

some type of information was presented, and some aspects of
the stimuli, such as basic emotional characteristics, may
be processed.

At the other end of the continuum is

complete subjective awareness where subjects are able to
report content of the stimuli.

The current data suggest

attentional biasing most likely occurs during early stages
of awareness (Mathews,

1993).

Although subjects cannot

report the semantic nature of the information, the
emotional features of the stimuli (threatening vs. non
threatening) still may be processed,

leading to an

attentional bias.
If this line of theorizing is correct, then
attentional biases may be more automatic than strategic.
However, it also is possible that strategic processes
occurring at later stages of processing can in turn affect
attentional processes.

This seemingly paradoxical effect

could occur if certain strategies increased the saliency or

emotionality of threatening stimuli.

For example,

strategic acts of avoidance may increase the salience of
the topic by pairing the information with distracting
stimuli.

Research has shown that cue salience augmentation

is associated with increased attentional allocation to that
cue (Lavy & van den Hout, in press).

Another potential

manner avoidance could cause increased attentional bias is
through increasing the emotionality of the stimuli.
Consider an example where an individual attempts to
suppress thoughts of the threatening topic.

If suppression

attempts prove unsuccessful, then emotional aspects of the
material may increase because of the failure experience or
because the attempts to suppress increased the frequency
the threatening thought.
Thought Suppression
Recent endeavors have been made to experimentally
study avoidant coping strategies by requesting that
subjects not think about certain topics (eg. Clark, Ball, &
Pape,

1991; Lavy & van den Hout,

Carter, & White 1987).

1990; Wegner, Schneider,

In these experiments on thought

suppression, subjects typically are presented with a
concept or story and are requested not to think about that
topic for an allocated time.

A consistent finding of this

research is that the suppression manipulation actually has
the paradoxical effect of increasing thoughts associated
with the forbidden topic.

23

This paradoxical effect was originally demonstrated by
Wegner and his colleagues (Wegner, et al.,

1987).

In these

studies, subjects were asked to either express or suppress
thoughts of a given topic (eg., a white bear).

In the

second phase of the experiment, subjects who initially
suppressed the topic then were asked to intentionally think
about it, while those who initially expressed the topic
were asked to suppress it.
expression periods,

During both suppression and

subjects were requested to ring a bell

when thoughts of the topic came to mind.
design, Wegner et al.

Using this

(1987) found subjects reported

significantly more thoughts of a topic if the expression
period followed the suppression period.

Similar effects

were found in other studies using slightly different
methods (Clark, et al.,

1991; Lavy & van den Hout,

1990).

This research is significant to the current study
because the thought suppression paradigm may provide a
technique to investigate potential cognitive biases
occurring because of avoidant coping strategies.

Of

particular interest to this study is determining whether
certain avoidant techniques, such as suppression, result in
increased attentional allocation to the suppressed topic.
Although only one study has addressed this issue (Lavy &
van den Hout, in press), results from other research may
offer insight into potential mechanisms accounting for how
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suppression could lead to increased attention directed
toward the suppressed material.
Thought suppression and emotion.

One potential manner

whereby suppression could lead to increased attention is
through increasing the emotionality of the suppressed
thought and/or increasing the distress caused by the
suppressor.

The studies investigating the relationship

between suppression and mood fall into two categories:
those measuring autonomic indices of suppression and those
investigating suppression in an emotionally distressed
population.
Wegner, Shortt, Blake, and Page (1990) originally
addressed the question of whether increased autonomic
activity occurs during suppression.

In a series of

studies, Wegner and his colleagues measured changes in skin
conductance during expression and suppression of both
exciting and unexciting thoughts.

In the initial

investigation, subjects both expressed and suppressed
thoughts of sex, dancing, parents, and school
administrators for a period of three minutes each.

Sex was

considered the exciting thought, while the other topics
were viewed as unexciting.

These researchers found that

skin conductance levels during both suppression and
expression of sexual thoughts differed from every other
condition.

In other words, both suppressing and expressing

thoughts of unexciting topics failed to produce changes in
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skin conductance when compared to each other or to
baseline.

Conversely, when subjects expressed and

suppressed thoughts of sex, measures of skin conductance
differed significantly from baseline and from unexciting
topics.

No differences in skin conductance levels were

found between the suppression of sex and the expression of
sex.
In a follow-up study presented in the same article
(Wegner et al.,

1990), subjects either suppressed thoughts

of sex and expressed thoughts of weather or expressed
thoughts of weather and suppressed thoughts of sex.

The

suppression and expression conditions each lasted for 30
minutes, resulting in one hour of monitoring for each
subject.

During all periods, the researchers required

subjects to report thought content while skin conductance
measures were taken.

Correlations coefficients were

calculated within each minute across the 30 minute
intervals between the number of mentions of the topic (sex
or weather) and changes in skin conductance levels.

A

significant relationship between thoughts of the topic and
increases in skin conductance was found only for subjects
required to suppress thoughts of sex.

No relationship

between skin conductance and the number of topic mentions
was found for the weather suppression condition or either
expression condition.

These results were interpreted to

mean that the act of suppressing an emotional topic results
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in heightened autonomic activity when intrusions are
experienced.

In other words, avoidance through suppression

sets the stage for heightened emotional reactions when the
suppressed topic returns.
One problem with this conclusion, is that the data
cannot establish a temporal relation between changes in
skin conductance and mentions of the suppressed topic.
Therefore, whether intrusions during suppression lead to
increased skin conductance levels or whether heightened
autonomic activity leads to thought intrusions is unclear.
Merckelbach, Muris, van den Hout, and de Jong (1991)
directly addressed this problem by investigating
electrodermal responses immediately after a report of an
intrusion.

Specifically, these researchers required half

the subjects to suppress thoughts of a white bear for a
period of five minutes,

followed by a period in which the

subjects were instructed to think of anything at all.
the other half of the subjects the order was reversed.
addition to standard measures of skin conductance,

For
In

subjects

were equipped with a hand held event marker that marked the
polygraph chart when pressed.

Subjects were told to

activate the event counter when they thought of a white
bear.

Skin conductance changes were judged to be related

to white bear thoughts when the electrodermal change
occurred 5 seconds before an event mark, and was not due to
respiratory irregularities.

Measures of autonomic activity
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during baseline did not differ between groups.

However,

for those subjects who initially suppressed thoughts of a
white bear, spontaneous fluctuations of electrodermal
activity preceded a significantly greater percentage of
white bear thoughts.

This relationship between skin

conductance changes and thoughts of a white bear was found
during suppression and expression conditions.

Thus,

thoughts of a suppressed topic result in immediate
fluctuations in autonomic activity when subjects are
initially required to engage in suppression.
One possible explanation for these results argues that
the electrodermal fluctuations result from heightened
emotionality of the topic.

In other words, the act of

suppression increases the emotionality of the suppressed
topic, even if this topic was originally of neutral
valence.

However, the question remains of how suppression

could increase the emotionality of the topic.

When

considering exciting thoughts, one potential explanation is
that cognitive avoidance through suppression results in a
failure for the subject to emotionally habituate to
thoughts of that topic (Wegner, et al.,

1990).

Therefore,

if one attempts not to think about sex, intrusions will
continue to be as emotionally laden as the initial thought
of sex.

The individual then will continue to experience

the full intensity of the emotion associated with the
thought.
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This explanation could not explain how a inherently
neutral topic becomes more emotional.

Therefore, an

alternative hypothesis is that suppression results in
increased emotionality because of the individual's failure
to successfully suppress.

This negative emotion then is

paired with the unsuccessfully suppressed topic.

In other

words, because intrusions are by definition failures to
suppress, the intrusive thought is marked by negative
emotion.

Although there is no direct empirical support for

this hypothesis, the current data from Merckelbach et al.
(1991) may support this explanation.

Since the suppressed

topic in this experiment was neutral and not inherently
emotional,

initial intrusions should not have produced an

autonomic response.

Thus, finding electrodermal

fluctuations immediately after thoughts of a neutral, but
forbidden topic suggests that the autonomic response is a
function suppression failure rather than the inherent
emotional characteristics of the thought.
In a separate group of studies Wenzlaff and colleagues
investigated thought suppression in the context of a
negative emotional state (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Klein,
Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper,

1988).

1991;

In a study of

individuals experiencing a depressed mood, Wenzlaff et al.
(1988) found that depressed subjects exhibited greater
difficulty in suppressing thoughts associated with a sad
story than did subjects who were not experiencing a sad
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mood.

The authors hypothesized that depressed subjects

were more likely than non-depressed subjects to use other
negative thoughts to distract themselves from the forbidden
topic because of increased accessibility to the negative
thoughts.

Furthermore, the authors predicted that negative

thoughts should prove less effective than positive thoughts
in distracting the individual from the suppressed topic.
This effect would be realized presumably because negative
distracting thoughts are more closely associated to the
forbidden topic than positive thoughts.

A stream of

consciousness analyses suggests that this hypothesis may be
correct.

Specifically, it was found that following

thoughts of the forbidden topic, depressed subjects
reported thinking other negative thoughts while non
depressed subjects thought about positive topics.
Based on the results of this study, the authors
concluded that attempts to suppress negative thoughts will
more likely meet with failure if the individual is
depressed.

The proposed explanation for this effect is

that depressed individuals are more likely to use negative
distractors because negative thoughts are more accessible.
Since the distractor and forbidden topic are emotionally
related, the depressed individual will more likely
experience an intrusion.

Further investigations on the

relation between mood and thought focused on the
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possibility that mood state itself could cue thoughts of a
forbidden topic.
This issue of mood as a context that can inhibit
successful suppression was investigated by Wenzlaff,
Wegner, and Klein (1991).

In the first of two studies, the

investigators experimentally manipulated subjects’ mood
into either a positive or negative mood state using musical
recordings.

The subjects then either suppressed or

expressed thoughts of a white bear.

After a 15 minute

manipulation check and distraction task, subjects were
again exposed to either uplifting or depressing music.
However, during this period all subjects were instructed to
express thoughts of a white bear.

Subjects who were

instructed to initially suppress and were also in the same
mood condition during both suppression and expression
reported significantly more thoughts of a white bear during
the second expression condition than did subjects who
initially suppressed but were in different mood conditions
during suppression and expression.

For subjects who were

initially instructed to express thoughts of a white bear,
no differences in reported mentions occurred between the
two mood conditions during the second expression period.
In a second study presented in the same article,
subjects again were instructed to either suppress or
express thoughts of a white bear during a musical mood
manipulation.

After a brief period, all subjects were told
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to express thoughts of a white bear.

Immediately following

this expression period, subjects' mood state was assessed
using an adjective checklist.

When mood state was used as

the dependent variable, a significant interaction was found
between initial suppression/expression condition and mood
induction condition.

Specifically, after the second

expression period, subjects who initially suppressed white
bear thoughts and who were in the negative mood condition
rated their current mood state as significantly more
negative than subjects in the positive mood condition.

No

differences in mood state were found for subjects who
initially expressed thoughts of a white bear.
The findings of these two studies were taken as
evidence that mood state forms a unique bond with
suppressed thought.

In the first study, greater numbers of

previously suppressed thoughts occurred when the subject
was in the same mood state during both expression and
suppression periods.

The second study concluded that

expression of a previously suppressed thought affected the
subjects' mood state such that current mood was similar to
the affective state present when the topic was being
suppressed.
One implication of these results is that avoiding an
aversive thought through suppression can result in a
vicious cycle of thought suppression followed by
intrusions.

For example, consider an emotionally

32

distressed individual who attempts to suppress disturbing
thoughts because she finds these thoughts too upsetting.
Firstly, this current body of research suggests that a
distressed individual will have greater difficulty
suppressing an upsetting topic.
initially suppressed,

If, however, the topic is

future intrusions will result in the

individual experiencing a return to the previously
distressed emotional state.

The mood state may then act as

a cue, thereby increasing the number of disturbing
intrusions.

The individual, distressed by these

intrusions, then may make further attempts to suppress.
Attention and thought suppression.

As alluded to

previously, a potential effect of thought suppression could
be a paradoxical increase in attentional resources
allocated to identifying the suppressed stimuli.

While the

literature on thought suppression does not directly address
the effect of suppression on attention, results from these
studies suggest an explanation of how suppression can
result in increased attention.
In the previous discussion of attention, the
suggestion was made that attentional bias most likely
occurs on a fairly automatic level and results from
negative affect associated with a particular area of
concern (Mathews,

1993).

Although the influence of

avoidant strategies on attentional processes is currently
unknown, results of previous studies could be used to

33

support the hypothesis that avoidant strategies may
increase attention directed toward suppressed information.
Increased attentional allocation to the suppressed
topic could occur if suppression increased the negative
emotionality of suppressed information and/or led to
increased negative affect experienced by the individual.
Results of the thought suppression literature suggest that
both increased emotionality of suppressed information and
increased negative affect levels are likely to occur.
Experiments using measures of autonomic activity found that
expression of a previously suppressed thought results in
electrodermal fluctuations (Merckelbach et al.,

1991).

Also suggested was that the act of suppression itself
increases the emotionality of the forbidden topic.

In

addition, certain emotional topics may produce even greater
autonomic reactions because emotional properties associated
with the information are never processed fully (Wegner, et
al.

1990).
Another line of research suggests that if an

individual attempts to suppress information while in a
negative mood state, future intrusions of the suppressed
information will be linked with negative mood (Wenzlaff, et
al.,

1991).

It is likely that an individual's desire to

suppress information is due to the effect the information
has on the individual's emotional state.

Therefore,
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subsequent intrusions may increase the negative affect
experienced by the individual.
Lavy and van den Hout (in press) conducted a study
directly attempting to determine how suppression
subsequently impacts attention.

In this investigation,

subjects were randomly divided into either control or
thought suppression groups.

The subjects in the thought

suppression condition were instructed not to think about
"numbers" while those in the control condition could think
of anything.

Subsequent to this manipulation, all subjects

participated in a color naming task with two types of
stimulus words: number words and substance words (control).
The results of this study showed only limited support for
the hypothesis that suppression leads to slower responses
for the relevant words.

Specifically, the research found

only during the first fifteen trials did thought
suppression subjects show higher levels of interference for
words relevant to suppression (number words).
A number of factors may account for the marginal
finding in this study.

Firstly, the unemotional nature of

the suppressed topic is one reason the effect may have been
so transient.

Although suppression itself may increase the

emotionality of neutral information (Merckelbach, et al.,
1991 ), it is likely that greater effects would be found for
inherently emotional topics (Wegner et al.,

1990).

A

second possibility is that subjects would have been more
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motivated to suppress if the topic was both disturbing and
personally relevant.

Finally, failure to suppress

information that is both disturbing and personally relevant
likely would result in greater levels of emotional distress
which in turn may result in increased attention directed
toward the suppressed information.
In sum, suppression of thought seems to undermine
emotional control by establishing conditions where the
unwanted emotional thought is easily activated (Wegner, et
al.,

1990).

One possible reason these unwanted thoughts

intrude into awareness is that the act of avoidance
paradoxically increases attention directed toward the
unwanted topic (Lavy & van den Hout, in press; Mathews,
1993).

The aim of the second part of this project was to

test the hypothesis that increased attentional resources
would be allocated to previously suppressed information.
In this project the suppressed information was both
distressing and personally relevant, thus exploring a
previously untested variable.
Overview of Proposed Study
The general aim of this study was to investigate the
effect of a major stressor, a heart attack, on an
individual's cognitive processes.

Individuals who have had

a heart attack provide an interesting population for
studying the cop.ing responses to a major stressor.
attack is a real, objectively defined, and distinct

A heart

stressor.

As previously discussed, MI patients report

emotional changes after an attack, and develop rather
specific worries about the future.

In the first part the

study, I intended to investigate potential attentional
biases that may have resulted as a function of the
patient's emotional and cognitive state.

It was predicted

that MI patients would show longer response latencies for
cardiac related stimuli when compared with control
subject's responses.

Specificity in the attention

capturing features of the distractors was also hypothesized
such that the response time latencies to sociallythreatening distractors for MI subjects would not differ
from response time latencies for neutral distractors.
It has been suggested that certain avoidant cognitive
strategies,

such as suppression, lead to increased

attention toward suppressed information (Lavy & van den
Hout, in press; Mathews,
Wegner & Erber,

1992).

1993; Suls & Fletcher,

1985;

If this suppressed information is

particularly disturbing, then the paradoxical increase in
attention can potentially lead to further emotional
distress for the individual.

For example, consider an

individual who attempts to suppress thoughts of a heart
attack because of the negative emotional characteristics
associated with MI thoughts.

If suppression leads to

increased attentional capture for cardiac stimuli, the
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increased identification of threatening stimuli may result
in higher levels of arousal and negative affect.
In the second part of this study, avoidant coping
styles were artificially manipulated by requesting that
half of the subjects avoid thoughts associated with cardiac
functioning.

The other half of the subjects thought about

anything at all.

It was predicted that suppression of

heart-related thoughts would result in longer response
latencies for cardiac distractors.

However, it was

suspected that suppression of cardiac thoughts would be
particularly difficult for subjects who experienced an MI,
as cardiac-related thoughts are frequent, emotional, and
personally relevant (Wiklund, et al.,

1986).

Therefore,

it

also was predicted that the increase in attentional bias
would be evident particularly for MI patients.
To test these hypotheses, MI patients and age-matched
controls participated in a attentional bias task.

The

subjects were presented with an attentional search task
requiring them to locate and respond to a particular
stimuli when distractors are present.

It was predicted

that performance of MI patients, but not control subjects,
would slow when cardiac-related distractors were present.
Following this task, half of the subjects were instructed
not to think about heart attacks or anything related to
cardiac functioning for five minutes.

The other half of

the subjects thought of anything at all for five minutes.

38

Upon completion of this manipulation,

subjects again

completed the attentional search task in order to assess
how suppression affects allocation of attentional
resources.

Finally, all subjects were instructed to think

about anything for a period of five minutes and to record
number of heart related thoughts.

It was predicted that

subjects who were previously instructed to suppress would
experience more heart-related thoughts in this second
period of thought monitoring.
As previously discussed, how predisposing
characterological features effect attentional biases and
the ability to successfully suppress information is
unclear.

The results of one study (MacLeod & Mathews,

1988) suggest that individuals who are trait anxious may be
predisposed toward developing attentional biases to
stressful stimuli.

Therefore, trait anxiety as measured by

the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, et
al.,

1970) was administered to all subjects in order to

determine if differences in report of trait anxiety effect
attentional processes.

Measures of state anxiety and

depression also were measured to assess the influence of
current mood state on response time latencies to threat
cues.
Other research by Miller (1980; Miller & Birnbaum,
1988) suggests certain individuals may be more successful
at avoiding stressful stimuli, while others tend to seek

out stress-relevant information.

This individual

difference variable may influence both attentional
processes and the ability to suppress.

An individual's

coping style could influence measures of attentional bias
if the strategic processes of coping are directly related
to attention.

Also, if coping style influences the ability

of an individual to successfully suppress information,
certain individuals may experience less intrusive thoughts
after a period of suppression.

To assess the possible

influence of an individual's coping style on attention, the
Miller Behavioral Style Scale was administered to all
subjects.
Finally, other individual difference factors such as
cardiac concern level may contribute to the degree of
attentional bias.

Cardiac concern level was measured

using a 14-item scale requiring subjects to rate the degree
they think or worry about cardiac functioning.
It was predicted that measures of emotional distress
(trait anxiety, state anxiety, and depression) and concern
regarding the MI would have a positive relationship with
response time latencies for MI subjects when threat-related
words were present.

Although it is possible that coping

style would be associated with measures of attentional
bias, a significant relationship was not predicted.

The

prediction of the null hypothesis for coping style is based
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on the assumption that attentional biases are more
automatic while measures of coping reflect only a preferred
behavioral style (Mathews,

1993).

METHODS

Subjects
Two groups of subjects participated in this study: MI
patients (n=34) and control subjects with no history of
heart disease (n=3l).

Qualified MI patients were sent a

letter requesting participation in a study investigating
psychological sequelae of a heart attack.

Two private

cardiology clinics provided names and addresses of
prospective subjects.

A staff cardiologist had diagnosed

all subjects in this group with myocardial infarction based
on clinical, electrocardiographic, and laboratory data.
Response rate to this call for volunteers was approximately
1 in 10.

No information was collected on individuals

unwilling to participate.

Three respondents who were

currently using anxiolytic medication or who had a
significant psychiatric history were excluded from
participation.
Individuals age- and sex-matched to MI patients were
recruited to serve as control subjects.

Exclusion criteria

for this group included known history of coronary artery
disease and previous psychiatric contact.

All subjects had

at least a high school education and were able to read
information presented on the computer screen.

One control

subject was excluded after reporting difficulty reading
instructions on computer screen and being able to identify
target words on practice trials.
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Finally, subjects were
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informed of their rights as subjects and were required to
sign an informed consent (see Appendix B).
Measures
Demographic information.
demographic information form.

All subjects received a
Information on age, gender,

sex, education level, marital status, possible psychiatric
history, and current prescription medication was collected
(see Appendix A).

Additional information collected on MI

subjects included length of time since MI, history of heart
disease before MI, and history of previous myocardial
infarcts.
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI).
(Spielberger, et al.,

The STAI

1970) is an instrument designed to

measure both state and trait levels of anxiety.

State

anxiety refers to feelings of tension, apprehension, worry,
and nervousness reported by an individual.
state is viewed as dynamic and changing.
however,

This emotional
Trait anxiety,

is conceptualized as more stable and enduring, and

specifically refers to a predisposition to respond
anxiously to stressful situations.

In this questionnaire,

each of these constructs is measured via a 20-item scale
and thus produces two scores: a trait anxiety score and a
state anxiety score (see Appendix C).
Extensive normative and psychometric data have been
gathered on the STAI.

In addition to normative data

gathered on general population adults, norms for general

medical and surgical patients also are available.

Test-

retest reliabilities for trait anxiety averaged .76, and
the average test-retest reliability coefficient for state
anxiety was .33 (Spielberger, et al.,

1970).

The greater

variability in state anxiety scores was expected because
this construct is hypothesized to measure a transitory
emotional state.

Measures of internal consistency were

greater than .90 for both measures of state and trait
anxiety.

In terms of concurrent validity, the STAI has a

strong relationship with other measures of anxiety such as
the IPAT Anxiety Scale (Cattell & Scheier,
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor,

1963) and the

1953).

Miller Behavioral Style Scale (MBSS).

The MBSS is a

scale designed to identify individual differences in
avoidant versus attentive coping strategies (Miller,

1980).

The assumption underlying this scale is that certain
individuals use avoidant strategies when coping with stress
(blunters), and others attend to stressful information
(monitors).

In the MBSS, respondents are presented with

four hypothetical situations followed by eight statements,
half reflecting a monitoring strategy and half reflecting a
blunting strategy.

Subjects are instructed to place a mark

next to each behavior they may have used in responding to
the hypothetical situation (see Appendix D).

Scores

derived from this scale include a monitoring score and a
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blunting score.

These two scores can be combined to form a

composite score or can be used separately.
Normative data based on either the responses of
college students or various medical populations are
available.

Internal consistency coefficients average .71.

Test-retest reliabilities range from .68 to .79, with
monitoring scores showing slightly more stability than
blunting scores (Miller,
1983).

1980; 1987; Miller & Managan,

In addition, Miller and colleagues (Miller,

Miller & Managan,

1987;

1983) have shown the MBSS successfully

discriminates between coping style and measures of trait
anxiety, depression, and Type A behavior.

Additionally,

the constructs of monitoring and blunting were shown to be
independent of social desirability (Fuller & Conner,

1990).

In terms of predictive validity, the MBSS has been shown to
predict behavior in an experimental task when subjects were
threatened with electric shock (Miller,

1987).

Cardiac Concern Questionnaire (CCQ ).

The CCQ was

specifically created for the current project and was
designed to measure level of worry regarding cardiac
functioning.

Modeled after other self-rating scales of

cardiac concern (Thompson, et al., 1987), the CCQ is
comprised of 14 questions designed to cover the following
domains: worry regarding the MI, concern about future
cardiac problems, concern regarding cardiac state affecting
social/occupational functioning, and hypersensitivity to
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aberrant cardiac sensations.
zero to eight.

Responses to items range from

One total score of general cardiac concern

is derived from this questionnaire, with larger scores
reflecting greater cardiac concern (See Appendix F).
Center for Epidemiological Studies - Depression Scale
(CES-D).

To assess for level of depressive symptomology

all subjects completed the CES-D (Radloff,

1977).

This

instrument is a 20-item, self-report measure requiring
respondents to rate the frequency of depressive symptoms in
the past week (see Appendix G).

The CES-D was developed

for research in non-psychiatric populations and is
appropriate for use in medically-ill and healthy samples
(Devins, Orme, Costello, Binik, Frizzell, Stam, & Pullin,
1988).

Although items contained on the scale were designed

to measure the affective component of depressed mood, other
researchers have suggested that the CES-D can be used as a
general measure of psychological distress because some
items measure anxiety and self-esteem (Orme, Reis, & Herz,
1986).

The scale has good internal consistency (.85 to

.90), and a large body of normative data has been gathered
on the scale (Lewinson & Lee,
Rating of MI severity.

1981; Rehm,

1988).

The proposal for this project

included MI severity ratings to be completed by the
patient's cardiologist.

Unfortunately,

staff physicians

were unwilling to complete the rating form, and therefore,
data on this variable was not obtained.
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Attentional Search Task
The following task was derived from the procedures
used in Mathews et al.

(1990).

During this procedure,

subjects were presented with a group of three words on a
computer monitor.

One of three words was a target word,

while the other two words present in this group were
distractors.

Subjects were informed that the goal of this

task was to locate the target word and respond by pressing
the appropriate key on the keyboard.

Subjects completed a

total of 258 trials.
Procedure.
follows.

The specific steps for each trial were as

Three plus signs (+) appeared vertically on the

monitor and were spaced one inch apart.

These plus signs

served only to initially orient the subject's vision and
were presented only for 500 milliseconds (ms) before being
immediately replaced by three- word groups that included
one target word and two distractors.
used, namely "right" and "left".

Two target words were

Only one target word

appeared on screen in each three-word group.

If the word

"right" appeared, the subject should have responded by
pressing a key marked "RIGHT".

(The "/" key was covered

with a label with "RIGHT" printed on it).

If the word

"left" appeared, the subject should have responded by
pressing a key marked "LEFT".

(The "z" key was covered

with a label with "LEFT" printed on it).

The target word

was randomly placed at one of the three possible vertical
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locations.

After the subject responded with a key press,

the screen appeared blank for 500 ms.

The phrase "Get

Ready" appeared for 500 ms and was followed by a new trial.
Distractors.

The other two words presented with the

target word are known as distractors.

The three different

types of distractors presented with the target word
included 21 cardiac-related words, 21 socially threatening
words, and 21 categorized neutral words (See Appendix G).
Words within the distractor groups were matched for length
and frequency based on the standards provided by Francis
and Kucera (1982).

Both distractors were drawn from the

same category for all trials.

For example, the target word

"right" may have been presented with the words "heart" and
"blood", both cardiac distractors.
Materials.

Stimuli were presented on the monitor of a

Zenith Supersport 286 portable computer and controlled
through the use of Micro Experimental Lab (MEL) software
(Schneider,

1988).

Thought Suppression Manipulation
Following the attentional search task, subjects were
randomly assigned into one of two experimental conditions:
a suppress-thought condition and a free-thought condition.
Instructions for both conditions appeared on computer
screen.

Subjects in the suppress-thought condition were

instructed not to think about their heart functioning or
any cardiac-related stimuli for five minutes.

In other
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words, these subjects were instructed to actively avoid
thinking about any topic related to cardiac functioning.
Subjects in the free-thought condition were instructed to
think of anything they desired to think about.

References

to cardiac-related thoughts were equal in number for each
instructional set.

An equal number of references to

"heart" were made to ensure that any putative effects
occurring after the suppress-thought manipulation would not
be due to merely mentioning the topic.
In both conditions,

subjects were instructed to ring a

desk bell if they experienced any cardiac-related thoughts
during the five-minute period.

The experimenter left the

room during the thought monitoring period, and bell rings
were recorded on a tape recorder.

After the experimental

session, the tape was played back and the number of bell
rings coded.
Upon completion of the suppression/free thought phase,
subjects were informed to cease monitoring their thoughts
and to think about anything they desired.

Subjects then

were asked to again participate in the attentional search
task.

The procedures involved in the second attentional

search task were identical to those previously described
(selecting target word "left" or "right" from a three-word
group).

Upon completion of the second attentional search

task, all subjects participated in a five-minute period of
free thought.

Instructions for this condition were
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identical to those given in the free-thought condition
previously described, and tape recorded bell rings were
again used to measure cardiac thought frequency.
To review, subject participation in this study
occurred in five distinct phases:
attentional search task,

(1) participation in

(2) participation in either free-

thought or suppress-thought condition [Period 1] (3 )
participation in attentional search task (4) participation
in a period of free-thought [Period 2] and (5) completion
of self-report questionnaires.
Procedure
MI subjects who responded who participated were tested
in meeting rooms located in the cardiology clinic.

Control

subjects completed the experimental procedures either in a
student office located in the Psychology Department at
Louisiana State University or in their home.

After signing

the informed consent, all subjects began the experiment by
participating in the attentional search task.

Subjects

then were assigned alternately to either the suppress
thought or free thought condition.

Following the five

minute period of cardiac thought monitoring required in
each condition, all subjects again participated in an
attentional search task that was identical in both
procedure and content to the initial search task.

After

the second attentional search task, all subjects
participated in a five minute period of thought monitoring.
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The instructions used in this final period of thought
monitoring were identical to the instructions previously
administered in the free thought condition.

Subjects

completed the experiment by responding to the
questionnaires presented in the following order:

State-

Trait Anxiety Inventory, the Cardiac Concern Questionnaire,
the Center for Epidemiological Studies - Depression Scale,
and the Miller Behavioral Style Scale.

RESULTS

Proposed Analyses
Descriptive information.

Demographic information

(Appendix A) for MI and control subjects are presented in
Table 1.

The two groups were equivalent in terms of age,

education level, race, and sex.

Presented in Table 2 are

group means for all self-report measures (STAI-T, STAI-S,
CCQ, CES-D, and MBSS).

A between-subject group t-test was

performed for each measure to assess for differences on
these measures.

This series of analyses indicate the

groups differed on the Cardiac Concern Questionnaire,
t ( 1, 63 ) = 29.82, £ < .001, and the CES-D, t(1,63) = 4.96, p
<.05, with MI subjects exhibiting heightened levels of both
cardiac concern and depressive symptoms (See Table 2).

No

group differences or trends emerged for measures of trait
anxiety (STAI-T), state anxiety (STAI-S), desire to seek
information (MBSS-Monitor), or desire to avoid information
(MBSS-Blunt).

When compared with standardization samples,

the CES-D, STAI-S, and STAI-T means are within normal
limits for both MI and control samples (Devins, et al.,
1988; Spielberger, et al.,

1970).

Medication usage was recorded for all MI subjects.
The most common pharmacological agents taken by the
subjects in this sample included vasodilators, calcium
channel blocking agents, antihypertensives, beta blocking
agents, and aspirin.

Of particular interest to this study
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Table 1
Demographic Information

MI Subjects

Mean Age
Level of Education:
High School

60.94(11.84)

Control Subjects

59.37(10.90)

12%

21%

Technical College

15%

12%

Some College

12%

19%

College Graduate

40%

39%

Graduate School

21%

9%

Black

8%

6%

White

92%

94%

Male

71%

68%

Female

29%

32%

95.27(56.43)

NA

Yes

45%

NA

No

55%

NA

Yes

28%

NA

No

72%

NA

Ra c e :

Sex:

Mean Days Since MI
Known CAD prior to MI:

Previous M I :

CAD - Coronary artery disease
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Table 2
Group Means for Self-report Measures and Demographic
Frequencies

MI Subjects

Control Subjects

Self-report Measures
CCQ

32 .50(17.1 1 )

12.60(10.40)**

CES-D

10 .11 (9 .1 5 )

6. 06( 6.04 )*

STAI-S

29.94(9.87 )

27.65(6.57)

STAI-T

3 2 .47(9.28 )

32.75(8.28)

MBSS (Monitor)

9.21(2.58)

9.68(2.46)

MBSS (Blunt)

4 .41 (1 .82 )

4.16(2.81)

*
* *

-

_

() CCQ STAI-S STAI-T Monitor
Blunt -

significant at the .05 level
significant at the .001 level
standard deviation
Cardiac Concern Questionnaire
state anxiety
trait anxiety
desire to seek information
desire to avoid information
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were subjects taking beta blockers (n=9) because of
potential influences reaction time.

Although beta blocking

agents may have influenced subjects response time, it is
unlikely that its effect would differentially impact
reaction time to threat and neutral distractors.
Correlations.

Two separate interference indices were

computed by subtracting the reaction time (R T ) to sociallythreatening distractors and the RT to cardiac distractors
from RT for neutral distractors (MacLeod & Hagan,
MacLeod & Rutherford,

1992).

1992;

This computation was

performed only on trials occurring before the suppression
manipulation and yielded two indices of attentional bias:
Socially-Threatening Interference Index (Social Threat) and
Cardiac Threat Interference Index (Cardiac Threat).
Correlation matrices then were computed for Social Threat,
Cardiac Threat, CES-D, STAI-T, STAI-S, Cardiac Concern
Questionnaire (CCQ), MBSS-Monitor, MBSS-Blunt, cardiac
thought frequency during the first thought monitoring
period (Period 1), and cardiac thought frequency during the
second thought monitoring period (Period 2).

Separate

matrices were created for all subjects combined, MI
subjects only, and control subjects only (Tables 3, 4, and
5 respectively).

To control for Type 1 error, only

correlations whose p values were at .01 or below were
considered significant.
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix: Data for All Subjects

CTII
STII
BELLI
BELL2
CES-D
STAI-S
STAI-T
MONITOR
BLUNT
CCQ

CTI I
STI I
BELLI
BELL2
CES-D
STAI-S
STAI-T
MONITOR
BLUNT
CCQ

CTII

STI I

BELLI

1 .00
.44**
.11
.09
.16
.09
.20
.1 1
-.07
-.13

.44**
1 .00
-.09
.03
.42**
.32*
.38**
-.01
-.14
. 12

.1 1
-.09
1 .00
.73**
.13
.12
.23
.1 1
.05
. 10

.09
.03
.73**
1 .00
.37*
.32*
.21
.00
-.04
.32*

STAI-S

STAI-T

MONITOR

BLUNT

.09
.32*
.12
.32*
.62**
1 .00
.68**
.10
.01
.36*

.20
.38**
.23
.21
.62**
.68**
1 .00
.07
.00
.23

.1 1
-.01
. 11
.00
.04
.10
.07
1 .00
-.04
-.07

-.07
-.14
.05
-.04
-.12
.0 1
.00
-.04
1 .00
-.05

BELL2

* - significance level p < .01
** - significance level p < .001
CTII STII BELLI -

Cardiac Threat Interference Index
Social Threat Interference Index
# of heart-related thoughts during 1st
monitoring period
BELL2 # of heart-related thoughts during 2nd
monitoring period
STAI-S - state anxiety
STAI-T - trait anxiety
MONITOR - desire to seek threatening information
(MBSS-Monitor )
BLUNT desire to avoid threatening information
(MBSS-Blunt)
CCQ Cardiac Concern Questionnaire

CES-D
.16
.42**
.13
.37*
1 .00
.62**
.62**
.04
-.12
.45**
CCQ
-.13
. 12
.10
.32*
.45**
.36*
.23
-.07
-.05
1 .00
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Table 4
Correlation Matrix: Data for MI Subjects Only

CTII
CTII
STII
BELLI
BELL2
CES-D
STAI-S
STAI-T
MONITOR
BLUNT
CCQ

CTII
STII
BELLI
BELL2
CES-D
STAI-S
STAI-T
MONITOR
BLUNT
CCQ

STII

BELLI

BELL2

CES-D

1 .00
.47*
.10
-.06
.30
.08
.29
.30
-.22
-.02

.47*
1 .00
-.06
. 17
.51 *
.36
.50*
.23
-.04
.23

.10
-.06
1 .00
.69**
.23
.29
.18
-.28
-.04
.29

-.06
.17
.69**
1 .00
.48*
.44*
.24
-.23
-.02
.37

.30
.51 *
.23
.48*
1 .00
.77**
.72**
.07
.07
.38

STAI-S

STAI-T

MONITOR

BLUNT

CCQ

.08
.36
.29
.44*
.77**
1 .00
.78**
.1 1
.17
.42*

.29
.50*
. 18
.24
.72**
.78**
1 .00
.02
.12
.41

.30
.23
-.28
-.23
.07
.11
.02
1 .00
-.19
.03

-.22
-.04
-.04
-.02
.07
.17
.12
-.19
1 .00
.1 1

-.02
.23
.29
.37
.38
.42*
.41
.03
.11
1 .00

* - significance level p < .01
** - significance level p < .001
CTII STII BELLI -

Cardiac Threat Interference Index
Social Threat Interference Index
# of heart-related thoughts during 1st
monitoring period
BELL2 # of heart-related thoughts during 2nd
monitoring period
STAI-S - state anxiety
STAI-T - trait anxiety
MONITOR - desire to seek threatening information
(MBSS-Monitor )
BLUNT desire to avoid threatening information
(MBSS-Blunt )
CCQ Cardiac Concern Questionnaire

Table

5

Correlation Matrix: Data for Control Subjects Only

CTII
STII
BELLI
BELL2
CES-D
STAI-S
STAI-T
MONITOR
BLUNT
CCQ

CTII
STII
BELLI
BELL2
CES-D
STAI-S
STAI-T
MONITOR
BLUNT
CCQ

CTII

STII

BELLI

BELL2

CES-D

1 .00
.42*
.13
.20
-.02
.15
.25
-.01
.05
-. 51 *

.42*
1 .00
-.08
-.10
.42*
.46*
.39
-.08
-.22
.15

.13
-.08
1 .00
.90**
.1 1
.1 1
.29
.39
.1 1
.00

.20
-.10
.90**
1 .00
.20
.03
.24
.39
.00
.06

-.02
.42*
.1 1
.20
1 .00
.32
.55**
.22
-.44*
.34

STAI-S

STAI-T

MONITOR

BLUNT

CCQ

. 15
.46*
.1 1
.03
.32
1 .00
.59**
.07
-.17
.07

.25
.39
.29
.24
.55**
.59**
1 .00
.13
-.11
-.02

-.01
-.08
.39
.39
.22
.07
.13
1 .00
.11
-.08

.05
-.22
.1 1
.00
-.44*
-.17
-.11
.1 1
1 .00
-.32

-.51*
. 15
.00
.06
.34
.07
-.02
-.08
-.32
1 .00

* - significance level p < .01
** - significance level p < .001
CTII STII BELLI -

Cardiac Threat Interference Index
Social Threat Interference Index
# of heart -related thoughts during 1st
monitoring period
BELL2 # of heart -related thoughts during 2nd
monitoring period
STAI-S - state anxiety
STAI-T - trait anxiety
MONITOR - desire to seek threatening information
(MBSS-Monitor )
BLUNT desire to avoid threatening information
(MBSS-Blunt )
CCQ Cardiac Concern Questionnai re
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When the data for all subjects were included, a
strong positive relationship was found among all measures
of emotional distress (CES-D, STAI-T, and STAI-S), and
between measures of current emotional distress (CES-D and
STAI-S) and the CCQ.

Additionally, the CES-D (r = .42 , £

< .001), the STAI-S (r = .33, £ < .01), and STAI-T (r =
.38, £ < .001) showed a positive relationship with Social
Threat.

The only other significant correlation to emerge

was between bell rings in the second thought monitoring
period and the CES-D (r = .37, £ < .01), the STAI-S
.32, £ < .01), and the CCQ (r =

(r =

.32, £ < .01).

Inspection of the separate correlation matrices for MI
subjects and control subjects suggests some variables have
differing interrelationships for the two groups.

Table 4

indicates when the data from MI subjects alone were
analyzed, measures

of emotional distress (CES-D, STAI-S,

STAI-T) were again highly correlated with each other.
While only the STAI-S was significantly correlated with the
Cardiac Concern Questionnaire (r = .42, £ < .01), the
relationship between both the CES-D and the CCQ (r = .38, £
> .01) and the STAI-T and the CCQ (r = .41, £ > .01)
approached significance.

Additionally, a significant

positive relationship was found between Social Threat and
the CES-D (r = .51, £ < .01) and Social Threat and the
STAI-T (r = .50, £ < .01).

The relationship between state

anxiety (STAI-S) and Social Threat approached significance
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(r = .36, £ > .01).

Finally, both measures of current

emotional distress (CES-D and STAI-S) were positively
correlated with bell rings during the second period of
thought monitoring.
The matrix derived from control subjects' data shows
cardiac concern and measures of emotional distress were
uncorrelated (see Table 5).

However, a strong positive

correlation was found again among CES-D, STAI-S, and STAIT.

Control subjects,

like MI subjects, showed a strong

positive correlation between Social Threat and measures of
emotional distress (CES-D - r = .42, £ < .01; STAI-S - r =
.46, £ < .01; and STAI-T - r = .39, £ > . 0 1 ) .

An

interesting relationship present only in control subject
data emerged between the Cardiac Concern Questionnaire and
Cardiac Threat (r = .-51, £ < .01).

This finding indicates

that RT speeding occurred for control subjects who
acknowledged greater concern regarding their cardiac
functioning.

Finally, the blunting scale of the MBSS was

negatively correlated with the CES-D (r = -.44, £ < .01).
Analysis of variance.

Reaction time outliers were

removed by selecting only responses within 100 ms and three
standard deviations of each subject's mean (Mathews, et
al.,

1990).

A repeated measures analysis of variance was

conducted with two within-subject factors (Word type and
Time) and two between-subject variables (MI group and
Suppression group).

Word type has three levels (cardiac-
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related, socially-threatening, and neutral distractors) and
Time has two levels (the attentional search task conducted
before and after the Thought Suppression Manipulation).
The response time means for all cells are presented in
Table 6.
Of particular interest in this study were potential
interactions involving Word type.

Although a main effect

for Word type approached significance F(2,124) = 2.84, £ <
.07, no significant interactions with Word type were
present.

A main effect emerged for Time F(1,62) = 4.86, £>

< .05, indicating that RTs quickened after the suppression
manipulation.

This effect was moderated by a Suppression

Group x Time interaction F(1,62) = 4.07, jp < .05.

A review

of Table 7 shows that the degree of change in RT depended
upon whether subjects were instructed to suppress thoughts
about their heart functioning or to think about anything.
Contrary to prediction, RTs for the suppress-thought
condition showed some evidence of speeding when compared to
RTs for the free-thought condition.

However, no

significant interactions included the factor Word type, and
therefore, this finding did not address the hypothesis that
suppressing cardiac thoughts later increases attention
directed to heart-related words.

A follow-up analysis was

conducted using only heart-related and socially threatening
distractor RTs as the dependent variables and using RT to
neutral words as a covariate.

In this analysis of
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Table 6
RT Means (in Milliseconds) for Proposed Analysis of
Variance

MI SUBJECTS
Suppress thought
(n = 17)
Before

After

Free Thought
(n=17)
Before

After

Word type
Cardiac

971(293)

917(212)

946( 190 )

927( 181)

Social

976(262)

932(213)

949(187)

932(169)

Neutral

951(267)

921(211 )

936(188)

917(173)

CONTROL SUBJECTS
Suppress thought
(n=15 )
Before

After

Free Thought
(n = 16)
Before

After

Word type
Cardiac

869(151)

819(112)

928(187)

946(190)

Social

874(164 )

81 3(1 03)

936(214)

940(201)

Neutral

867(176)

811(103)

920(177)

940(216)

( ) - standard deviation
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Table

7

RT Means (In Milliseconds) for Time x Suppression Group
Interaction

Suppression Group
Suppress Thought

Free Thought

Time 1

913

935

Time 2

865

933
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covariance, there were no significant main effects or
interactions.

The failure to find any significant

differences indicates that the main variables of interest,
RT to cardiac and socially threatening distractors, neither
changed after the suppression manipulation nor were
affected by MI group membership.
Regression.

To assess the influence of state anxiety,

trait anxiety, depression level, cardiac concern, coping
style, and MI group on interference from socially
threatening and cardiac distractors, two regression
equations were computed.

In the first equation, RT when

cardiac distractors were present served as the dependent
variable.

RT when neutral distractors were present was

entered initially into the equation, and the resulting
residual was used as a measure of interference from cardiac
distractors.

RT when neutral distractors were present

proved to have a strong relationship with RT when cardiac
distractors were present (R square = .94).

All other

variables (CES-D, STAI-S, STAI-T, MBSS-Monitor, CCQ, and MI
group) then were entered into the equation.

Those that did

not contribute to prediction of the residual were removed
in a stepwise fashion.
As shown in Table 8, a combination of CCQ, STAI-T, and
MI group was the best predictor of interference from
cardiac distractors F(3,60) = 3.78, p < .05 (R square
change = .001).

In addition to the proposed dependent
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Table 8
Regression Equation Predicting RT When Cardiac Distractors
Were Present After First Accounting for Variance Shared
with RT When Neutral Distractors Were Present
---------------- Variables in the Equation ----Variable
Partial Corr
T
Sig. of T
CCQ
STAI-T
MI

-.08
.08
.06

-2.66
2.62
2.12

.01
.01
.04

Significance of R square change:
F(3,60 ) = 3.78, £ < .02

Introduction of Interaction between CCQ and MI group-Variable

Partial Corr

Interact

.06

T
2.01

Sig. of T
.05
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Table

9

Regression Equation Predicting RT When Socially Threatening
Distractors Were Present After First Accounting for
Variance Shared with RT When Neutral Distractors Were
Present

Variable
CES-D

Variables in the Equation ----Partial Corr
T
Sig. of T
3 .64

.0006
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variables, an additional variable was created to represent
the interaction between MI group and the CCQ (Interact).
This interaction term was included because an inspection of
the correlation matrices for MI and control subjects
suggests that the relationship between CCQ and Cardiac
Threat differs for the two subject groups.

Inclusion of

the Interact variable in the regression equation proved
significant, F (1,59) = 4.05, £ < .05, and indicates that
CCQ differentially predicted cardiac threat interference
for MI and control subjects.
To predict interference from socially-threatening
distractors,

similar regression procedures were used.

Response time latencies when socially-threatening
distractors were present were used as the dependent
variable.

To control for individual differences in

reaction time, response time latencies when neutral words
were present were entered first into the equation and this
variable again accounted for 94% of the variance.

The

remaining variables then were entered into the equation,
and those that failed to predict the residual were removed
in a stepwise fashion (See Table 9).

In the resulting

equation only CES-D remained, and this equation reached
significance, F(1,62) = 13.24, p < .01 (R square change =
.01 ).

As indicated in the correlation matrix for all

subjects, other measures of emotional distress were also
significantly correlated with Social Threat.

However, due
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Table 10
Frequency of Cardiac Thoughts

Period 1
Suppress Thought
Condition
(n = 33 )
Free Thought
Condition

Period 2

1.91

2.97

3.29

2.77

(n = 3 1 )

Period 1
MI
Subjects
(n = 34 )
Control
Subjects
(n = 3 1 )

Period 2

2.44

3.67

2.73

2.03
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to the variance common to the three measures of emotional
distress, only the scale with the greatest correlation
coefficient was included in the regression equation.
Effect of suppression instructions on frequency of
heart-related thoughts.

Bell rings were used to measure

frequency of heart related thoughts during Period 1 and
Period 2.

To assess for changes from the first thought

monitoring period to the second, a mixed analysis of
variance was conducted that included one within-subject
factor, Session (first and second), and two between-subject
variables, MI group and Suppression group.

In this

analysis two 2-way interactions emerged: Suppression group
x Session F (1,61 ) = 5.92, p < .02, and MI group x Session
F (1 ,61 ) = 7.25, p < .01.

The means for both 2-way

interactions are shown on Table 10.
Post-hoc contrasts then were performed to further
explore each interaction.

When using the means derived

from the Suppression group x Session interaction, the only
significant comparison to emerge was between the two
suppression conditions during Period 1.

This indicates

that subjects in the suppress- thought condition reported
fewer cardiac-related thoughts than subjects in the freethought condition.

Post-hoc comparisons of cell means from

the MI group x Session interaction were performed using
Tukey's test.

The only significant comparison found was

between MI and control subjects during Period 2.

This
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finding suggests that during a period of free thought, MI
subjects reported more heart-related thoughts than control
subjects.
Exploratory Analyses
The findings from the proposed analysis of variance
failed to support the main hypotheses of interest as no
significant interactions with Word type emerged.

However,

results from correlation matrices and regression equations
indicate other variables,

specifically negative

emotionality (CES-D, STAI-S, and STAI-T) and level of
cardiac concern (C C Q ), moderate the subject's RT when
socially threatening or heart-related words were present.
The analyses performed in this section were designed to aid
in the understanding of the moderating effects of negative
emotionality and level of cardiac concern.
Effects of negative emotionality and cardiac concern
on the attentional deployment task.

In the following

analysis, only RT measures obtained before the Thought
Suppression manipulation were included.

Excluding all RTs

greater than 3 standard deviations of subjects mean or less
than 100 ms again discarded aberrant responses.

Conducting

a median-split based on subject CCQ scores formed two
cardiac concern groups (high and low).

To produce

equivalent cell sizes it was necessary to use different
medians for MI and control subjects.

A negative-

emotionality factor was created based on median-splits
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using either CES-D scores (high and low depression), STAI-S
scores (high and low state anxiety), and STAI-T scores
(high and low trait anxiety).

Again, different medians

were used to avoid creation of unequal cells, but for these
measures the absolute differences between the MI group
median and control group median were small.
Separate analyses were conducted for MI and control
subjects.

The decision to analyze the two subject groups

separately was based on the

following criteria:

presence of an interaction between MI group and

(1)
the CCQ in

regression equations, and (2) use of disparate CCQ medians
for MI and control subjects

(MI subjects - median = 34;

control subjects - median =

12).

Three ANOVAs were conducted separately for MI and
control subjects.

Each of the three analyses included one

within-subject factor, Word type, and two between-subject
factors, Cardiac Concern group and Negative Emotionality
group (using either CES-D, STAI-S, and STAI-T).

In other

words, three separate analyses were performed, and in each
analysis only one of the three measures of distress was
used to create the Negative Emotionality variable.

The

repetition of similar analyses was conducted because of the
post-hoc nature of this investigation.
In the first analysis, the Negative Emotionality
variable was formed through a median split of trait anxiety
scores, thus forming high- and low-trait anxious groups.

As previously described, the analysis also included one
other between-subject factor, Cardiac Concern group (high
and low), and one within-subject factor, Word type.

For MI

subjects, only Word type effect emerged F(2,60) = 3.11, £ =
.05.

To further explore this main effect, Tukey1s test was

used to compare the RT means for cardiac, sociallythreatening, and neutral distractors.

RT when socially-

threatening distractors were present differed from RT when
neutral were present, but the RT to socially-threatening
distractors did not differ from RT to cardiac distractors.
Although RT to cardiac distractors failed to differ from RT
to neutral distractors, this contrast approached
significance.

An inspection of the means presented on

Table 11 suggests that RTs to both cardiac and sociallythreatening distractors were slower than RT to neutral
distractors.
In the analysis involving control subjects, two 2~way
interactions were present: Trait Anxiety group x Word type
F(2,54) = 9.50, p < .001, and Cardiac Concern group x Word
type F(2,54) = 4.60, p < .02.

The means for both

interactions are presented on Table 12.

To further

investigate this interaction, Tukey's test was used again.
For the Trait Anxiety group x Word type interaction, RT to
threat cues (cardiac and socially threatening distractors)
were compared with RT for neutral distractors thus creating
an interference index for both socially-threatening and
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Table 11
The RT Differences Between Word Type Categories for MI
Subjects

Word type
Cardiac

Social-Threat

Neutral

958

962

943
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Table 12
RT Means for Analysis Involving Cardiac Concern Group,
Negative Emotionality Group*, and Word Type for Control
Subjects

Word type
Trait Anxiety Group
Cardiac

Social-Threat

Neutral

High Trait Anxiety
(n = 16)

893

921

875

Low Trait Anxiety
(n=15 )

905

887

914

Word type
Cardiac Concern Group
Cardiac

Social-Threat

Neutral

High CCQ Group
(n = 1 6 )

943

972

957

Low CCQ Group
(n = 15 )

852

835

827

* -

Median split of STAI-T scores were used to
create two groups
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Figure 1
Interference Indices for Cardiac and
Socially Threatening Distractors
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cardiac distractors.

The only significant contrast was

between socially-threatening and neutral distractors for
high trait-anxious subjects.

Although no other contrasts

were significant, RT to socially threatening distractors
actually was faster than RT to neutral distractors for low
trait-anxious subjects.
To investigate the interaction between Word type and
Cardiac Concern group, RTs to cardiac and social
distractors were again compared with RT to neutral
distractors for both high and low cardiac concern subjects.
Using these procedures, no contrasts proved significant.
However, as presented in Figure 1, inspection of
interference indices suggests that high cardiac concern
subjects, but not low cardiac concern subjects, show faster
RT to cardiac distractors than to neutral distractors.

RT

to socially-threatening distractors was comparable for both
groups.
When CES-D or state anxiety scores were used to create
the Negative Emotionality factor, an identical pattern of
results emerged for control subjects, and therefore, these
analyses will not be presented in detail.

For MI subjects

a similar but not duplicate pattern was present.
Consequently a brief presentation of the analyses will
follow.
When state anxiety scores were used to create the
Negative Emotionality factor, a non-significant effect
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emerged for Word type, F(2,60) = 2.80, £ < .07.

When CES-D

scores were used to create the Negative Emotionality
factor, the effect for Word type again proved significant,
F(2,60) = 5.68, £ < .005.

Post hoc contrasts followed the

same pattern as described previously.

Additionally, the

use of CES-D scores produced an interaction between CCQ
group, CES-D group, and Word type, F(2,60) = 4.5, £ < .02.
Inspection of the means presented in Table 13 suggests that
RTs to cardiac and social distractors were slower than RTs
to neutral for MI subjects reporting high levels of
depression but low levels of cardiac concern.

However,

because only five subjects were included in this cell and
because this interaction did not emerge in other analyses,
the finding is viewed as unreliable.
In sum, the results for the control subjects is
comparable for all measures of negative emotionality.
Individuals reporting high levels of depression, traitanxiety, or state-anxiety show an attentional bias toward
socially-threatening words.

For control subjects reporting

high levels of cardiac concern, presence of cardiac
distractors was associated with RT speeding when compared
with subjects reporting low cardiac concern.
pattern emerged for MI subjects.

A different

A review of the data

suggests that compared with neutral distractors, RTs were
slower for social threat words, and RT means for cardiac
and social threat words were equivalent.
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13

Cardiac Concern Group, and Depression Group (Median Split
of CES-D Scores Were Used to Create Two Groups)

MI SUBJECTS
High Depression
H igh CCQ
Low CCQ
(n = 12)
(n = 5 )

Low Depression
High CCQ
Low CCQ
(n = 5 )
(n = 12 )

Word type
Cardiac

896

941

1016

1005

Social Threat

918

931

1006

1001

Neutral

900

863

990

1002

DISCUSSION

Summary of Main Findings
The self-report data showed MI subjects reported
higher levels of depressive symptoms and cardiac concern
than controls.

However, on measures of state anxiety,

trait anxiety, and desire to seek information, no
differences were found for MI and control subjects.

Means

for all measures of emotional distress were within normal
range for both MI and control subjects.
Based on the data collected from the attentional
search task, MI patients did not show specific interference
effects from cardiac stimuli.

When the data from MI

subjects were analyzed separately, RT to socially
threatening distractors were slower than RT to neutral
distractors.

Additionally, no differences were found

between RT to cardiac and socially threatening distractors,
suggesting that specific attentional biases to cardiac
stimuli did not emerge after an MI.
For control subjects RT latencies appeared moderated
by negative emotionality and cardiac concern level.
Subjects reporting high levels of depression/anxiety showed
longer RT latencies when socially-threatening words were
present then when neutral distractors were shown.

A

unexpected effect for control subjects was an interaction
between distractor type and cardiac concern level.

An

inspection of the interference indices for both cardiac and
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social threat suggested high cardiac concern subjects
showed faster RT latencies when heart-related distractors
were present.
When bell rings were the dependent variable, subjects
instructed to suppress thoughts about their hearts reported
fewer cardiac-related thoughts than those instructed to
think about anything at all.

During the second thought

monitoring period involving free thought, MI subjects
experienced more cardiac-related thoughts than control
subjects.

Finally, the hypothesis that suppressing heart-

related thoughts would later increase attention toward
cardiac stimuli was unsupported.
Attention to Threat
The attentional search procedures used in this study
required a subject to identify a target word presented
simultaneously with two distracting words.

As previously

described, three distractor categories were used, and the
dependent variable of interest was the subject's RT
latency.

It was assumed that if RT latency was greater for

certain distractors, the interference in performance would
be due to the attention capturing properties of the
distracting stimuli.

Alternative hypotheses suggest RT

delay for certain distractors could be due to competition
for priority between target word and distractor during
later processing stages.

While it is recognized that

attentional capture is only one possible explanation for
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interfering effects, other investigators have suggested it
is the most likely mechanism (Mathews,

1993).

Therefore,

throughout this discussion the terms "attentional bias" and
"interfering effects" will be used interchangeably,
although other explanations may in fact be correct.
Personal relevance and threat specificity.

It was

hypothesized that following a major stress such as an MI,
only threat information relevant to the stressor would
capture attention.

The regression equation computed to

predict cardiac threat showed MI subjects displaying
greater interference from cardiac distractors than control
subjects.

However, the analysis of variance indicates MI

subjects attend equally to social and cardiac distractors.
This suggests MI patients may develop a general bias toward
threatening information.
Why did MI subjects display a general interference
effect for threatening stimuli?

One contributing factor

could be that emotionally disordered subjects were excluded
from this study.

In fact, CES-D, STAI-T, and STAI-S means

indicated the MI subjects in this study were in the normal
range of emotional functioning.

A review of the literature

suggests threat specificity is more common in anxiety
disordered populations than in non-psychiatric, anxious
controls.

Logan and Goetsch (1993) concluded in their

literature review that the majority of studies involving
anxiety disordered patients found specific attentional

biases; that is, patients attended to stimuli associated
with their main area of concern.

For example, spider

phobics attended to information relevant to spiders (Watts,
et al.,

1986) and PTSD rape victims attend to assault-

related cues (Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak,
1990).

& McCarthy,

However, in investigations of non-psychiatric

subjects, only a few studies found threat specificity.
Most studies involving analogue populations have found
similar attention capturing effects for threat-relevant and
threat-irrelevant stimuli (MacLeod & Mathews,

1988; Mogg,

Mathews, Bird, & Macgregor-Morris, 1990).
The finding that no differences were found between RT
means of cardiac-relevant and cardiac-irrelevant threat
cues for MI subjects is consistent with the attention
literature on non-psychiatric subjects.

It was

hypothesized MI subjects would show distinct attentional
biases to cardiac cues because of negative emotion and
specific worry about future cardiac problems.

However, the

data suggested MI subjects attended to threat but failed to
discriminate between different threatening cues.
Control subjects showed some evidence of an
attentional response specificity.

Subjects reporting high

levels of concern showed RT speeding to cardiac, but not
socially threatening, distractors.

This unexpected finding

raises questions regarding the processing of threatening
information in subjects not selected based on emotional
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state.

Although the literature reviewed involved either

anxiety disordered or analogue populations, data from two
studies using non-psychiatric subjects augment the current
finding that normal subjects may actually avoid threatening
information.
MacLeod and Mathews (1988) investigated the influence
of a stressor, taking an exam, on high and low traitanxious students.

All subjects participated in an

attentional search task requiring them to detect a probe
that was preceded either by a neutral word or exam-related
word.

Subjects were tested on two occasions; six weeks and

one week before an examining period (ie., final exams).
During the first testing period, no word type or group
differences were found.

However, when the examination

period was one week away, a trait-anxiety and word type
interaction emerged.

The results indicated high trait-

anxious students would attend to exam-related words, while
low trait-anxious students would avoid these same stimuli.
Using a color-naming task in place of the dot-probe
paradigm, MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) found high and low
trait-anxious students avoided exam-related cues when an
exam was to occur within a week.

When tested under low-

stress (non-examination) periods, subjects showed no
differences in RT between exam and non-exam words.
The findings from this current study are in many ways
comparable to the two experiments just described.

When
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heart related topics are viewed as threatening, control
subjects avoid the threat cues.

This suggests normal

controls show an inattention to personally-relevant,
threatening information.
Although cardiac concern was associated with faster RT
for control subjects, this measure failed to predict RT
latencies for MI subjects.

It had been predicted that

cardiac concern level would be associated with longer RT
latencies for cardiac distractors.

Therefore, a discussion

of the findings should include reasons we failed to find
either enhancing or interfering effects associated with
cardiac concern level for MI subjects.

One possible

explanation is that the CCQ measured different constructs
in the MI and control samples.

Inspection of the

correlation matrices for the two groups shows the CCQ was
significantly correlated with measures of emotional
distress for MI subjects but not controls.

It is

conceivable that the failure to find a relationship between
cardiac threat interference and the CCQ is because the CCQ
was not a pure measure of cardiac concern for MI subjects,
but instead functioned as a rather imprecise measure of
distress.
Other explanations that need to be accounted for
include the possibility of either a ceiling effect or a
restricted range of CCQ scores for MI patients.

Although

the distribution of CCQ scores appears normal for both MI

84

and control subjects, the level of cardiac concern was
significantly higher for MI than control subjects, and the
effect size for this difference was fairly large (.31).
This effect size is evident in an analysis of the
distributions; only one control subject had a CCQ score
higher than the mean CCQ score for MI subjects, and eightyfive percent of the MI subjects had CCQ scores higher than
the mean CCQ score for controls.

Because such a large

disparity in CCQ scores exists between the two populations,
the possibility of a ceiling effect remains.

It can be

argued that if cardiac concern had been activated to a
ceiling level in MI subjects, no true variability existed
in actual cardiac concern despite fluctuations in CCQ
scores.
Influence of emotional state on threat cues.

The

results from this study suggest negative emotionality is
associated with slower RT when social threat distractors
are displayed, this effect being present for both MI and
control subjects.

When median splits were conducted on

measures of emotional distress, a distress level by Word
type interaction was found for control but not MI subjects.
However, when measures of distress were not dichotomized,
both depression and anxiety scores were positively
associated interference from socially-threatening
distractors for MI subjects.

These findings suggest
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heightened levels of emotional distress is associated with
an attentional bias to socially threatening information.
As indicated in the post-hoc contrasts and the
correlation between distress measures and interference
indices, depression and anxiety showed a stronger
relationship with RT latencies for socially threatening
than cardiac distractors.

In a previous study using

socially-threatening distractors, Hope, Rapee, Heimberg,
and Dombeck ( 1990 ) used a Stroop paradigm to investigate
differences in color-naming latencies in socially-phobic
and panic patients.

Social phobics, but not panic

patients, displayed longer response latencies when social
threats were used.

Similar effects were found with

generalized anxiety patients who worried about social
issues (Mogg, et al.,

1989).

These findings, however,

contrast with a number of other studies involving both
generally anxious patients and anxious non-patients showing
no specificity for socially threatening stimuli (MacLeod,
et al.,

1986; Mathews et al.,

1990; Mogg & Marden,

1990).

In this study it is difficult to determine if general
emotional distress is associated exclusively with social
threat interference because cardiac and social threat
distractor categories were not matched on threat level.
Although untested, it is likely that the words used as
socially threatening distractors were generally more
threatening than cardiac words.

For example, words such as
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"heart" and "vein" do not generally carry the same
threatening connotation as do the social threat words such
as "idiot" or "ugly".

It is possible that physical

distractors equal in threat to social distractors, would
also cause interference in emotionally distressed subjects.
An additional possibility is that socially threatening
words were considered more emotional,

leading to the

apparent RT specificity to socially threatening distractors
for distressed subjects (Martin, Williams, & Clark,
State versus trait influences on attention.

1991).

A

question that is ubiquitous throughout the attentional
literature is whether the variable key to explaining
attention biases to threat is the current emotional state
or more enduring cognitive characteristics of anxious
subjects.

Unfortunately, the results of this study provide

little support for either position.

Measures of state and

trait anxiety were highly correlated with each other, and
both significantly predicted interference to socially
threatening distractors.

Therefore,

in this study it is

difficult to determine if selectively processing
threatening information is a function of a transient mood
state or a more enduring characteristic.
However, a general bias in attending to both cardiac
and social threat distractors was found for all MI
patients.

For control subjects, a main effect for word

type failed to emerge, and biases to social threat were
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moderated by anxiety level.

It was assumed that after

experiencing an MI, cardiac patients would report higher
distress levels than controls.

The two groups differed in

depressive symptomology, and therefore, the general threat
bias found in MI subjects could potentially be accounted
for by differences in distress.
This explanation, however, is not supported by the
finding that the CES-D scores for MI subjects did not
significantly differ from CES-D standardization norms.
Also, the results from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
suggest that MI and control subjects possessed comparable
levels of state and trait anxiety.

Previous experiments

have found attentional biases are more commonly associated
with anxious as opposed to depressed mood (MacLeod, et al.,
1986).

Therefore, the general bias found for MI subjects

may not be due to increased negative emotionality.

An

alternative explanation is that the experience of a severe
trauma automatically increases allocation of cognitive
resources to threat.

This bias to general threat could be

a universal reaction to severe stress, emerging even in
individuals who report being able to effectively cope with
the stressor.
Anxious or depressed mood: Does it matter?

In an

earlier study investigating the differing relationship of
depressed mood and anxious mood with attentional biases,
MacLeod et al.

(1986) found that clinically anxious

subjects, but not depressed ones, attend to threat cues.
However, more recent investigations suggest depressives may
also show an attentional bias to socially threatening
information (Mogg & Mathews, unpublished; Williamson,
personal communication).

In the current study, both

depression and anxiety scores were correlated with
interference from socially threatening cues.

Strong inter

correlations were found between the STAI and CES-D such
that the relationship between CES-D and either STAI-T or
STAI-S was comparable to the correlation between STAI-T and
STAI-S.

This pattern of results suggests the scales were

most likely a measure of distress,

involving both depressed

and anxious mood states (Orme, et al.,

1986).

Because the

scales were so highly inter-correlated, it is difficult to
determine if depression and anxiety had differing
influences on attention.

Therefore, a minimally

inferential conclusion drawn from this data is that
negative emotionality is associated with attention to
social threat.
Automatic versus controlled processes.

The paradigm

used in this study included only presentation of
supraliminal stimuli, thereby making issues of automaticity
difficult to assess.

However, the unexpected finding that

CCQ scores were negatively associated with cardiac threat
interference parallels with the recent findings of MacLeod
and Rutherford (1992).

These authors found when an
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experimental session was conducted in close temporal
proximity to an exam, students showed quicker RT latencies
in a Stroop task involving exam-related words.

However, if

the words in this task were presented at a subliminal
threshold, high trait-anxious students displayed longer
response time latencies.

The conclusion reached in this

article was that when subjects were aware of the words,
high anxious subjects used effortful processes to inhibit
interference from threat cues, thus leading to speeding.
It is possible that same explanation can account for
the negative relationship between RT latency to cardiac
stimuli and cardiac concern level for control subjects.
Participants most likely possessed some awareness of the
distracting stimuli, and controlled process could have been
used to avoid material considered threatening.
Unfortunately, subliminal presentation of stimuli was not
included in the procedures, and therefore, a direct
comparison with the data from MacLeod and Rutherford (1992)
cannot be made.
Influence of Suppression Instructions
Instructions either to avoid thoughts of one's heart
or to think of anything were included to test the impact of
suppressing threatening thoughts.

It was hypothesized

subjects instructed to suppress would later show an
increase in reported number of heart-related thoughts and
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in attention directed to cardiac cues.

The results of the

study failed to support either hypothesis.
Did subjects suppress?

An initial question to be

addressed is whether subjects were able to suppress heart
related information.

Previous studies have shown that if

subjects are instructed to suppress a particular topic,
they will report fewer thoughts of this topic than those
instructed to think anything at all (Clark, Winton, &
Thynn,

1993).

A review of the means presented on Table 10

shows that in this study subjects instructed not to think
about their heart had fewer bell rings than subjects
instructed to think of anything.

This finding indicates

that based on self-report of thought frequency subjects who
were directed to suppress were at least partially
successful in complying with the manipulation instructions.
Did "rebound" occur?

Wegner et al. (1987) also found

that subjects instructed to suppress a particular topic
reported fewer thoughts of the forbidden topic.
Additionally, these same subjects who initially suppressed
later experienced an increase in the thoughts they had been
previously asked not to think about.

This phenomenon was

coined "rebound" and was characterized by increased
experience of previously suppressed thoughts to a level
above that found when no suppression instructions were
given.

No evidence for rebound was found in the current

study.

Although a significant interaction emerged between
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thought period and suppression group, a review of the means
shows that the number of heart related thoughts were
comparable for both suppression conditions during the
second heart monitoring period (See Table 10).
Although rebound phenomenon has been reported in a
number of studies, other investigations have not found this
effect (Mathews, unpublished; Merckelbach, et al.,
Muris, Merckelbach, van den Hout, and de Jong,

1991;

1992).

The

current failure to replicate could be due either to the
unstable nature of the rebound phenomenon or because of
subtle changes in the design necessary for this experiment.
In all other studies, the second period of thought
monitoring immediately followed the suppression
manipulation.

In this study, the second thought monitoring

period followed an attentional search task that lasted
approximately five minutes.

If enhancement of previously

suppressed thoughts decays rapidly over time, this design
would not be sensitive to the rebound phenomenon.
Effect of personal relevance on thought decay.

In

this study an interaction between MI group and Session was
found showing controls reported a slight decrease in
thoughts from Period 1 to Period 2 while cardiac thought
frequency for MI subjects increased across time.

It is

important to remember that when Suppression group was
included as a factor, the 3-way interaction did not reach
significance, and therefore, the data reported in Table 10
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are collapsed across Suppression condition.

As described

in the Results section, post-hoc contrasts indicate bell
rings during Period 2 differed between MI subjects and
controls.

No other contrasts proved significant.

There are at least two interpretations of this
interaction.

One explanation is that MI subjects do not

show a decay in cardiac thought frequency across time, and
thoughts of one's heart may increase somewhat.

This

differs with the effect found for control subjects where
the number of thoughts slightly decreased from Period 1 to
Period 2.

An alternative and equally plausible explanation

is that MI subjects merely have more heart related thoughts
than control subjects.

In Period 1 half the subjects were

instructed to suppress while the other half thought about
anything.

Therefore, it is difficult to interpret the

meaning of these scores that were combined across both
suppression conditions.

However, in Period 2 all subjects

were instructed to think about anything at all, and this
period gives a purer measure of how frequently one will
experience a cardiac thought after that topic is mentioned.
Conclusions and Future Directions
Synopsis of the findings.

The aim of this study was

threefold: to investigate the impact of an MI on
attentional processes, to investigate the influence of
potentially moderating variables such as mood state, level
of cardiac concern, and coping style on attentional

93

processes, and to investigate the influence of intentional
efforts to suppress threatening thoughts.

The results of

this study suggest, though not unequivocally, that MI
subjects show a general tendency to attend to threatening
information.

In terms of moderating influences on

attention, the subject's level of depression and anxiety
predicted RT latency to socially threatening distractors.
In other words, greater negative emotionality was
associated with attention being directed toward socially
threatening stimuli.

For control subjects, cardiac concern

level was also associated with RT latencies for cardiac
distractors, but the influence on attention was in an
unexpected direction.

Specifically, subjects high in

cardiac concern showed RT speeding when heart-related
distractors were present suggesting these subjects avoided
the threatening stimuli.

Finally, subjects who were

instructed to suppress thoughts about their heart did
report fewer heart related thoughts than subjects
instructed to think about anything at all.
Unsupported hypotheses.

It may also be important to

discuss those hypotheses that received little support in
this study.

Contrary to prediction, MI subjects did not

show specific attentional biases toward cardiac threat cues
although the study possessed power adequate to find such an
effect (power = .86, assuming a medium effect size).
finding could reflect the

This

true attentional reactions that
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develop after an MI, but the failure to support the
hypotheses also could be a function of methods used to
measure attention.

As presented in Table 6, the standard

deviations for RT data was quite high, and this inter
subject variability could account partially for the failure
to find group differences.
However, previous research investigating less severe
stressors suggests high stress subjects show attentional
bias to both threat-relevant and irrelevant distractors
(Mogg et al.,

1990).

In the only other investigation of

attentional effects of a severe stressor, Foa et al (1990)
studied Stroop latencies for rape victims who had developed
PTSD and those who had not.

The authors found only those

women with PTSD showed longer response latencies to rape
related words.

Currently, there is little evidence to

indicate that attentional biases to specific threat stimuli
occur in non-psychiatric populations, but non-specific
threat biases have been found for subjects who have
recently experienced stress.
Another unsupported hypothesis was that subjects'
level of cardiac concern would be positively associated
with interference from cardiac stimuli.

Measures of

cardiac concern were negatively correlated with cardiac
threat interference for control subjects, but no
relationship was found between level of cardiac concern and
cardiac threat interference for MI subjects.

As previously

discussed, there are some concerns that the CCQ did not
adequately measure the cardiac concern construct for MI
subjects.

Two possible reasons this construct was measured

imprecisely for MI subjects include:

(1) depression and

anxiety may have factored heavily into the CCQ for MI
subjects but not controls, and (2) true cardiac concern was
activated to a ceiling level for MI subjects in spite of
apparent variability in CCQ scores.
Also absent in this study is any indication that
suppression of heart-related thoughts paradoxically
increased attention to cardiac cues in the period following
suppression.

This finding contrasts with results of Wegner

and Erber (1992) who found increased interference during a
Stroop task on topics that were suppressed.

Although there

are a number of methodological dissimilarities between this
current study and Wegner and Erber (1992), two differing
procedures are most likely the source of the discrepant
findings.

In the study by Wegner and Erber (1992) subjects

performed the Stroop task while simultaneously suppressing
a particular topic.

In the current study, the attentional

search task was conducted after the suppression period, and
subjects were explicitly informed that they were no longer
required to suppress.

Additionally, Wegner and Erber

(1992) only found longer RT latencies when a cognitive load
condition (memorization of a 9-digit number) was included
in the procedures.

Therefore,

findings from an other
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experiment suggest suppression may increase attention
directed to the suppressed topic, but only during active
attempts to suppress.

In the current study, no support was

found to indicate attention is directed toward the
suppressed topic after the subject ceases suppressing.
Finally, one aim of this study was to investigate the
hypothesis that self-report measures of coping style would
be associated with measures of attention to threat.
evidence was found to support this prediction.

No

The coping

style scale in this study provided a self-report measure of
an individual's preference to attend to (monitoring) or
avoid (blunting) a stressor.

Although for MI subjects,

monitoring was positively correlated with cardiac threat
interference, this relationship failed to reach
significance.

Also, no relationship was found between

monitoring style and social threat interference when the
responses for all subjects were considered (See Table 3).
Other self-report measures, notably measures of cardiac
concern and emotional distress, were shown to significantly
influence attentional responses.

This suggests that if

self-report of coping style does influence attentional
processes, its moderating effect is modest.
Implications for MI patients.

This study has few

implications for counseling individuals who experienced an
MI.

Although MI subjects were slightly more distressed

than age-matched controls, the level of depressive
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symptomology was in the normal range.

Not surprisingly,

level of cardiac concern was elevated for MI patients, and
greater concern was associated with increased anxiety
levels.

Unfortunately,

it is difficult to determine the

causal nature of this relationship as negative mood state
may produce worry about one's heart, or conversely worry
about one's cardiac state may lead to anxiety.
As previously discussed there is some evidence
suggesting MI subjects showed a general attentional bias to
threat information.

A recent study by MacLeod and Hagan

(1992) found that RT latency to threat in a subliminal
Stroop task later predicted emotional state in women who
were diagnosed with cervical pathology.

A strong

relationship remained intact even after effects of mood
state prior to diagnosis were partialled out.

These

findings suggest that MI subjects may be vulnerable to
developing emotional difficulties if further stressors are
encountered.
Future directions.

A growing body of literature is

indicating that normal subjects may avoid information
considered threatening.

As was present in this study and

in an experiment by MacLeod and Rutherford (1992), the RT
for normal subjects quickened when threat information was
presented supraliminally.

MacLeod and Rutherford (1992)

furthermore found that when the stimuli was presented
subliminally, attention to threat was found in high anxious
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subjects.

The disparity between sub- and supraliminal

presentation implies controlled processes may operate in
normals such that feared information is avoided.

However,

if control processes are impaired due to presentation of
stimuli without complete awareness, more automatic
reactions to the threat may occur.
It has been suggested that the difference between high
anxious normals and anxiety disordered patients is that
high anxious normals still possess resources to deal with
presentation of threatening information (Mathews,

1993).

In clinical patients, however, the availability of
resources to cope with stressors is limited.

So, while

normals possess the resources to avoid threat cues,
clinical patients attend to threatening stimuli.
Attention to threat also can be shown in normals if
the controlled process are restricted by some artificial
means.

Following this line of reasoning, control subjects

who report high levels of cardiac concern may actually show
attentional biases to heart cues if procedures used to
restrict the controlled resources were included.

Two

procedural changes that could possibly address this issue
would be either introduction of a cognitive load
requirement or subliminal presentation of the stimuli.

If

cardiac threat interference was found using this modified
presentation, this would argue that active attempts were
being made to avoid the threat cues.
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Conclusions.
not supported.

The main predictions of this study were

Namely, MI patients did not show specific

attentional biases to cardiac distractors nor did
suppression increase attention directed to the suppressed
topic.
emerge.

However, a number of interesting findings did
First of all, there was some indication that MI

subjects attended both to social and cardiac distractors
more than neutral distractors.

Secondly, cardiac concern

level was associated with RT speeding when cardiac
distractors were present.

Finally, emotional distress was

associated with longer RT latencies for sociallythreatening distractors.
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Age
Sex:
Race:

M

F
Black

Mafital Status:

White
Single

Other
Married

Divorced

Highest Level of Education Completed:
_____ some high school
_____ high school graduate
technical school
___ some college/university
college graduate
_____ graduate/professional school

Are you currently being seen by a psychologist, psychiatrist or
another mental health specialist? ____ Yes
No
Please list your current medications:
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CONSENT FORM
Louisiana State University Medical Center

I, ____________ _____ i______ (print name), freely and willingly
consent to participate in a research project investigating
psychological reactions to information related to heart disease.
The study is being conducted by Joseph I. Constans, M.S. and
Taryn James, graduate students at Louisiana State University, and
supervised by Dr. Phillip J. Brantley at Louisiana State
University Medical Center.
As a research subject, I understand that I will be required to
complete questionnaires (measures of mood, coping style, and
level of concern regarding heart functioning) and a demographic
questionnaire. I also agree, if asked, to allow my physician to
provide a rating of current cardiac functioning. In addition, I
agree to complete a 20 minute computer experiment which will
assess potential attentional biases.
I understand that all the information that I will provide in this
experiment will be strictly confidential and will not appear in
my medical chart. If the results of this study are published, I
understand that my name will not be used nor will any information
be identified with me personally. I also understand that I may
choose to decline to participate or withdraw from this study
without any penalty. In no way will my medical treatment be
affected by my decision not to participate in this study.
All my questions concerning this study have been answered. I
understand that I have the right to be provided with answers to
questions which may arise during the course of this study. I
understand that I have the right to contact, Dr. Phillip J.
Brantley at 358-1105 if any concerns about this experiment arise.
I have read and understand this consent form.
I acknowledge
that I have been given a copy of the consent form for my own
personal use.

Signature

Date

Witness

Date
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PLEASE NOTE

Copyrighted m at er ial s in this do cument have
not been filmed at the request of the author
They are availa bl e for consultation, however
in the a u t h o r ’s university library.
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1 18
DIRECTIONS: This questionnaire is designed to assess the degree to vfriich you think about
the functioning of your heart. Specifically, we are interested in getting a measure of
how concerned you are about your heart and potential heart related problems. In order to
assess your level of concern, we have developed this questionnaire consisting of 14 items.
For the following items, please read each question carefully and then use the following
rating scale to respond to the question.
If you will look at the rating scale printed below, you will see that the scale ranges
from 0 to 8. At various points along the scale, there ar certain words printed to help
you understand what each number represents. Please review this scale carefully and ask
the experimenter to explain it to you if you do not understand. After reviewing the
scale, begin answering the items. Remember, you can use any number from 0 to 8 to respond
to the questions.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

I------ 1------- ,-------,------- 1-------,------- 1------- ,------ ,

Never

1)

Seldom

Occasionally

Frequently

How often do you worry about having (or having another) heart attack?

2) How often do you think or worry about either currently diagnosed heart
disease or the possibility of developing heart disease?
3)

How often do you

talk about heart disease?

4) How often do you
become emotionally upset when thinking about problemsor
potential problems with your heart?
5) How often do you experience fear or anxiety when you have chest pain,
shortness of breath, or a strong or irregular heart beat?
6) How often do you worry about heart disease affecting possibly affecting
your sexual functioning?
7)

How often do you worry about heart related problems affecting your job?

8)

How often do you worry about heart related problems affecting your hobbies?

9) How often do you worry about heart disease affecting your relationships
with other people?
10) How often do you check your pulse?
11) How often so you check yourself for an irregular pattern of heart beating?
12) How often do you

feel that you are extra-sensitive to your heartfunctioning?

13) How often do you

experience chest pain or irregular heart beats?

14) How'often do you experience shortness of breath?

Always
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Name:_____________________________ Date:__________Age:____ Sex: Male

Female

I
CES-D
INSTRUCTIONS:

On the line, place the number of the statement which best
describes how often you felt this way DURING THE PAST WEEK.

e

1

Rarely or none
of the time
(less than 1 day)

Some or little
of the tiae
(1 to 2 days)

2

3

Occasionally or a
moderate amount of
time ( 3 to 4 days)

Most or all
of the tiae
(5 to 7 days)

I was bothered by thingp that usually don't bother me.
*e
I did not feel like eating; ay appetite was poor.........
1 felt that I could not shake off the blues even with
help from my family or friends............
4 . 1 felt that I was just as good as other people........... .6
.0
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what 1 was doing*
1.
2.
3.

6.
7.
8.
9.
18.

1 felt depressed.................................
I felt that everything I did was an effort........
1 felt hopeful about the future..................
1 thought my life had been a failure.............
1 felt fearful..................................

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

My sleep was restless...................
1 was happy............................
I talked less than usual......... ......
2 felt lonely. .........................
People were unfriendly..................

16.
17.
18.
19.
28.

I
I
1
I
I

enjoyed life.............................
had crying spells........................
felt sad................................
felt that people disliked me..........
could not get ’going*....................

2
2

3
3

2
2
2

3
3
3

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
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Relevant threat
(cardiac words)
angina
aorta
artery
attack
blood
bypass
cardiac
cardiology
chest
chestpain
clot
coronary
fatal
heart
jugular
pulsate
pulse
ribcage
surgery
valve
vein

Non-relevant threat
(social words)
abuse
alone
ashamed
bother
coward
clumsy
despise
dislike
dumb
embarrass
excluded
failure
foolish
harassed
hated
idiot
loathe
reject
stupid
tease
ugly

Non-threatening
(neutral words)
bathroom
carpeting
ceiling
chair
chimney
clock
couch
curtain
desk
detergent
floor
furnace
lamp
mirror
pillow
pitcher
plate
shelf
skillet
stair
wallpaper
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